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The objective of the research was to develop and validate a multifaceted model such as a fuzzy 
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) model that considers both qualitative and quantitative 
elements with relative significance in assessing the likelihood of falls and aid in the design of 
NASA Ground Support Operations in aerospace environments. The model represented linguistic 
variables that quantified significant risk factor levels. Multiple risk factors that contribute to falls 
in NASA Ground Support Operations are task related, human/personal, environmental, and 
organizational. Six subject matter experts were asked to participate in a voting system involving 
a survey where they judge risk factors using the fundamental pairwise comparison scale. The 
results were analyzed and synthesize using Expert Choice Software, which produced the relative 
weights for the risk factors. The following are relative weights for these risk factors: Task 
Related (0.314), Human/Personal (0.307), Environmental (0.248), and Organizational (0.130). 
The overall inconsistency ratio for all risk factors was 0.07, which indicates the model results 
were acceptable. The results show that task related risk factors are the highest cause for falls and 
the organizational risk are the lowest cause for falls in NASA Ground Support Operations. The 
multiple risk factors weights were validated by having two teams of subject matter experts create 
priority vectors separately and confirm the weights are valid.  The fuzzy AHP model usability 
was utilizing fifteen subjects in a repeated measures analysis. The subjects were asked to 
evaluate three scenarios in NASA KSC Ground Support Operations regarding various case 
studies and historical data. The three scenarios were Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF), Launch 




Concordance for assessment agreement between and within the subjects was 1.00. Therefore, the 
appraisers are applying essentially the same standard when evaluating the scenarios. In addition, 
a NASA subject matter expert was requested to evaluate the three scenarios also. The predicted 
value was compared to accepted value. The results from the subject matter expert for the model 
usability confirmed that the predicted value and accepted value for the likelihood rating were 
similar. The percentage error for the three scenarios was 0%, 33%, 0% respectively. Multiple 
descriptive statistics for a 95% confidence interval and t-test are the following: coefficient of 
variation (21.36), variance (0.251), mean (2.34), and standard deviation (0.501). Model 
validation was the guarantee of agreement with the NASA standard. Model validation process 
was partitioned into three components: reliability, objectivity, and consistency. The model was 
validated by comparing the fuzzy AHP model to NASA accepted model. The results indicate 
there was minimal variability with fuzzy AHP modeling. As a result, the fuzzy AHP model is 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
Objectives of Study 
 A research study will be performed at a NASA/KSC to quantify and describe the 
exposure-response relationships of the primary task-related, human/personal, organizational, and 
environmental risk factors that contribute to falls.  These relationships will be studied and 
quantified utilizing methodologies.  Analysis of various job tasks within an aerospace 
environment will allow for a comparison of different exposure levels to aid in quantifying the 
exposure-response relationship for each primary risk factor.  To accomplish this goal, the aim of 
the research is to develop a quantifiable, aggregate approach for quantifying risk of falls by 
considering broad categories of risk factors. The research objectives are:  
1) Identify and classify risk factors that contribute to falls in an aerospace environment. 
2) Develop a conceptual model that includes multiple risk factors that contribute to falls (i.e. 
human/personal, task related, environmental, organizational)  
3) Develop and validate a fuzzy analytical hierarchy process (AHP) model to predict the 
likelihood of falls and aid in the design of work areas in NASA ground support 
operations.  
In closing, the intent of the research is to develop and validate the model to alleviate falls.  
Significance of Research  
 As evidenced by the literature review presented in Chapter II, there is a significant 
amount of research in the area of falls however; many of the exposure-response relationships are 
ambiguous.  This is mainly due to differences in exposure measurement techniques, differences 
in research experimental designs, and unexamined interactions between the various risk factors.  
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Knowledge about risk factors leading to falls is essential for fall prevention (Hongwei Hsiao a; 
Petre Simeonova, 2001). Specifically knowledge of extrinsic and intrinsic factors that contribute 
to falls secure planning and occupational conditions for employers (Gauchard, G., 2001). Safety 
of work systems needs a holistic approach because it is a combination of many factors that affect 
the whole system simultaneously (Dagdeviren, M., 2008).  The current literature is narrow and 
the focus needs to be on the causation of workplace falls (Bentley, T., 2009). Therefore, there is 
a need for research on preventing falls. Thus, this study will address a significant void in the 
current knowledge base regarding the contributing risk factors that influence falls. The research 
outcome is to develop a model that will identify, quantify, and validate risk factors that may lead 
to falls and assist in the design of work environments specifically in an aerospace environment. 
As result, it will be imperative to propose fall protection guidelines for the workplace.  
Aerospace Environment  
 According to the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) Code, 
Aerospace Environment such as NASA/KSC is a multi work environment because NASA 
performs various industrial tasks such as roofing, construction, NASA ground support 
operations, space shuttle/rocket operations, launch, and landing; which fall under many codes 
(e.g. 927110 Space Research & Technology 4789-9902 Space flight operations). In fulfillment of 
the overall vision for space exploration, NASA continues to explore answers that power the 
future. NASA uniqueness regarding the Space Shuttle and Expendable Launch Vehicle missions 
require full process of elements and hardware delivery to the International Space Station. NASA 
Ground Support Operations is a component of an Aerospace Environment. At NASA/KSC, 
many employees perform daily tasks from heights in Ground Support Operations. Performing 
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work from an elevation can be detrimental to the success of the vision and ultimately lead to the 
risk of falls. The types of falls are same level falls and elevated falls. Same-Level Falls are 
recurring but are less severe. Elevated Falls do not frequently occur, however they are brutal.  Falls are 
among the highest causes of injury and death at NASA/KSC and second only to vehicle 
accidents as the leading cause of deaths. NASA has developed a fall protection class to educate 
employees on workplace falls. Figure 1 below shows a United Space Alliance (USA) engineer, a 













Figure 1: Engineer at NASA/KSC Fall Protection Training Class  
(NASA, 2005)  
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Research Gaps  
There are many gaps that need to be filled regarding fall prevention research. The research gaps 
are as follow: 
• Knowledge and understanding of contributing risk factors that influence falls in NASA 
Ground Support Operations ((Hongwei Hsiao, 2008; Petre Simeonova, 2001) 
• Aggregate impact and interactive nature of risk factors that influence falls (Gauchard, G., 
2001) 
• Model that quantifies risk factors that influence falls in an aerospace environment and 
specifically NASA Ground Support Operations  (Dagdeviren, M., 2008) 
 
The research gaps will be addressed by the following research objectives in this study. Please see 





















Figure 2: Research Gaps and Objectives 
 
Research Hypotheses  
 
The following are the research hypotheses, which include the null and the alternative.  
H0: The development of a conceptual model that characterizes risk factors can be useful 
in reducing the likelihood of falls in NASA Ground Support Operations.  
H1: The development of a conceptual model that characterizes risk factors cannot be 
useful in reducing the likelihood of falls in NASA Ground Support Operations.  
 
1 
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H0: A fuzzy analytical hierarchy process model can be developed and validated to 
predict the likelihood of falls in NASA Ground Support Operations.  
H1: A fuzzy analytical hierarchy process model cannot be developed and validated to 
predict the likelihood of falls in NASA Ground Support Operations.   
Research Questions 
1. What are the contributing risk factors that influence falls in the workplace? 
2. How do we quantify contributing risk factors that influence falls in NASA ground 
support operations?  
3. What is the aggregate risk value of these risk factors on falls?  
4. How we will predict the likelihood of falls?  
 
What is a fall?  
 
 






 A fall is defined as an event in which a person coming to rest unintentionally on the 
ground or other lower level, not by the result of a major intrinsic event such as (stroke) or 
overwhelming hazard (Tinetti, 1988). Falls are generally classified as an acute injury. Acute 
injury is an injury which occurs immediately after exposure to a hazard. Falls are under the 
umbrella of System Safety.    
 In the past, accident models came from operational safety and reflect on factors innately 
while protecting workers against industrial accidents. Now, these various models were applied to 
the complexity of work systems called system safety.  System Safety is the application of 
technical and management skills in a systematic approach to identify and control hazards 
throughout a process or program.  
Bureau of Labor Statistics  
According to Bureau of Labor Statistics, falls are detrimental to the human body. There 
are several case studies where the consequences of workplace falls lead to disabling body injury 
or permanently bodily damage. As the human body hit a lower level, there is a sudden force to 
the surface. As the result, the body is negatively impacted. Slips, trips, and falls are a major 
cause of injuries and fatalities in the workplace. About 50% of the workplace injuries at 
NASA/KSC are falls. According to the textbook, walking and working surfaces are surfaces or 
devices on which people stand, walk, work, and climb that can cause many accidents. The 




















According to BLS, the following table shows that falls (13%) are the second only to highway 
Fatalities (25%) regarding workplace deaths.  
Table 1: BLS Statistics 
(BLS, 2005)  
 
 
According to BLS, falls to a lower level is approximately 86 % of all Fall Fatalities. The falls 
categories are: Fall from ladder, fall from roof, and fall from scaffold.  
Table 2: BLS Fall Statistics 




The following figure shows the sources of the most fatal falls. The area that constitutes 
the most fatal falls are roofing at 36% of all falls. For example, in NASA Ground Support 
Operations, roofing is high area of concern for fall hazards. Another area of concern is 
scaffolding, which 17% of all falls. As a result, NASA is offering a fall protection course in 















Figure 5: Fatal Falls 













Vehicles 5% Other 20%
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Contribution and Benefits of this research  
 
This dissertation research will offer a contribution to field of fall protection of NASA 
Safety program. The fuzzy AHP model will be a great asset to the plethora of risk assessment 
literature and fall prevention studies because it provides granularity and gives insight regarding 
the fall risks. The contribution to the field of study is the utilization of the valid fuzzy AHP 
model to predict the likelihood of falls. The model is universal can be applied in any work 
environment. The benefit of this research will be the application of this model to a safety and risk 
management course at NASA/KSC. 
 
Overview of Gravitec Study 
 There are KSC environments where employees are required to perform tasks from 
various fall distances. To address the issue NASA contracted with Gravitec Systems Inc., a 
fall-protection engineering firm, who surveyed over 400 elevated work areas and gathered 
contractor input with respect to fall hazards. Facility maintenance, Space Shuttle operations, 
payloads, cranes, construction and roofing are areas of concern for fall hazards.  A hazard 
ranking system was developed based on factors that were considered easily measurable, 
highly relevant, and quantifiable. This ranking system is limited and it fails to include human 
factors, uncontrollable environmental factors, and working conditions in the evaluation of the 
workplace. Thus, there is a need for the proposed research.  
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Influence of Gravitec Study on my research 
 It was assumed in NASA Gravitec ranking system that multiple risk factors had a 
uniform influence on falls. The survey goals were to standardize fall protection programs, abate 
fall hazards across the center, identify existing facilities requiring fall protection systems, 
establish a baseline current fall protection methods status and benchmark KSC against the fall 
Protection industry. However, the purpose of this research is to develop and validate model to 
fulfill these goals. This research portrays the implementation of broad-scale prevention model 
that can significantly reduce fall injury claims.  
  
Theoretical Framework 
A theoretical framework is basically a conceptual model of how one makes logical sense 
of the relationships among several factors that have been identified as important to the problem. 
A typical theoretical framework provides a schematic description of relationships between and 
among independent, dependent, control, and extraneous variables so that a reader can easily 
comprehend the theorized relationships. What multiple risk factors lead to falls?  How to predict 
the likelihood of falls? Figure 6 is the ergonomics model presented in Bentley’s study. The 
model is about an information processing approach to the role of latent and active failures in 
workplace regarding slips, trips, and falls. Figure 6 shows that Latent Failures are extrinsic 




Figure 6: Theoretical Framework Model 
(Bentley, T., 2009)  
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Scope and Limitations of the Study 
 The scope of this research will be limited to addressing the primary risk factors such as 
task related (i.e. load handling/carrying, task duration, posture), human/personal (i.e. age, gender, 
slip/trip, behavior), organizational (i.e. safety culture/climate, job safety and risk training, 
production pressure) and environmental (i.e. poor lighting, ladder regulation, coefficient of 
friction) that lead to falls. Also, the interaction of multiple risk factors will not be investigated. 
This is reserved for future studies. While other factors have been identified that influence falls, 
many of these factors are often present in combination with the primary risk factors explored in 
this research. The research will investigate the likelihood of falls in an aerospace environment 
and particularly NASA ground support operations.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the research will focus primarily on multiple risk factors that contribute to 
falls in an aerospace environment. The research will emphasize the importance of system safety 
with respect to falls and concentrate on interdependence of falls. Ultimately, the result of the 
research is a methodical examination for fall prevention that lead will to fall protection 
guidelines.   
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Introduction 
To formulate the conceptual and quantitative model development, a comprehensive 
literature review was conducted. One objective of the literature review was to understand the 
previous approaches and methods taken by other researchers and thereby identify any gaps in the 
field.   
 The literature review will discuss the following topics:   
• Description of falls 
• Anatomy of a fall 
• Impact of falls on industry and workers  
• Studies that identified risk factors for falls  
• Studies by industry 
• Approaches to mitigate falls 
• Fuzzy models in risk assessment  
• Models and Tools for assessing risks and falls  
• Literature Review Summary  
Description of falls  
 Slips, trips and falls are one of the most common causes of injuries and fatalities in the 
general community (BLS, 2005). The first step to fall prevention is to have cognizance and 
knowledge of fall etiology. Etiology is origin or cause of an abnormal condition, disease, or 
injury.  Slips and trips are more than just a trivial problem (Maynard, 2002) in the workplace. 
The control of such incidents involves a complex array of factors. Falls are caused by a slip and 
trip (Davis, 1983 and Lipscomb, 2006), extrinsic and intrinsic factors (Gauchard, 2001), surface 
area and footwear (Hanson, 1999). Several fall injuries and fatalities originate multiple risk 
factors. The intrinsic risk factors among others are physical, behavioral, and apparel. The 
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extrinsic factors include the working surface and managerial factors. The risk factors that 
increase the severity of fall accidents result from factors such as physical tolerance of bones, 
body stamina, and harmful materials (Hsiao, 2008).  
The main consequences of falls are sprains and fractures (Manning, 1983) that can lead to 
work interruption due to disability, the length of which varies with age (Kemmlert and 
Lundholm, 1998), and can have detrimental economic repercussions for the employer. The study 
of slips and falls are complex, and involves various sciences and disciplines including 
ergonomics, biomechanics, psychology, and tribology (Maynard, 2002). Biomechanics is the 
analysis of how individuals walk and surface interface as they walk. Psychology is the 
perception and response to slippery conditions.  Tribology is the study of interaction of sliding 
surfaces and from the Greek language, “tribos,” which means rubbing. It is linked to friction 
between footwear sole and floor surface. It is imperative to consider the environmental surface 
and environmental conditions in order to mitigate falls. Multiple factors that contribute to falls 
are Human/Personal Factors (Davis, 1983), Environmental Factors (Hanson 1999, Hignet and 
Masud, 2006), Environmental Factors, and Organizational Factors (Gauchard, 2001 and 
Lipscomb 2006), and Task Related Factors (Maynard, 2002 and Gauchard, 2001). 
A fall sequence involves the following steps: occurrence of imbalance such as slip or trip, 
attempt to recover equilibrium or in case of recovery failure, a fall occurs when the body impacts 
the surface (Gauchard, 2001). The fall sequence is based on prioprioception in the human body.  
Prioprioception is an automatic sensitivity mechanism in the body that sends messages through 
the central nervous system (CNS). Prioprioception is the ability to sense the position, location, 
orientation, and movement of the human body.  
 17
  
Anatomy of a fall 
 The anatomy of a fall is the sudden, unanticipated descent in space driven by gravity. The 
consequences are often permanently disabling or even deadly. It takes most people about 1/3 
of a second to become aware. It takes another 1/3 of a second for the body to react. A body 
can fall up to 7 feet in 2/3 of a second. It is essential to understand the detailed analysis for 











Figure 7: Anatomy of a fall    
(BLS, 2004)  
  
.33 second/2 feet 
.67 second/7 feet 
1 second/16 feet 
2 second/64 feet 
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Impact of falls on industry and workers 
Work-related falls from heights remain a significant problem for workers in industry. An 
extensive literature review identified a number of environmental, task-related, and personal 
factors that degrade the control of balance and cause falls. These factors include visual exposure 
to elevation, unstable visual cues, visual impairment, confined and inclined support surfaces, 
unexpected changes in working surface, load handling/coupling, physical exertion, fatigue, 
personal differences, task complexity, work experience, training, and the proper use of personal 
protective equipment (PPE). In many instances, these procedures are not practical for the 
industry and current regulations allow the use of alternative means of fall protection, such as 
slide guards. The prevention of falls should consider the main effects and interactions of the 
environmental factors, task-related factors, and personal factors that affect the balance control of 
workers. After the model development and validation, the multiple risk factors that influence 
falls will also be examined to prevent falls.  
 
Studies that identified risk factors for falls  
There are several factors that contribute to task performance such as age, weight, height, 
foot size, gender, sex or even race may contribute to a fall.  The other factors that are involved in 
task performance are locomotors, visual factors, and fatigue affects (Davis, 1983) that lead to 
falls. It attempts to prevent injuries and illnesses by reducing or eliminating human exposure to 
occupational hazards.  In addition, it seeks to improve the match between the job and worker’s 
physical abilities, information management, and workload capacities. 
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A literature review has shown that multiple risk factors lead to falls. These risk factors can be 
broadly categorized as:  
• Task Factors are factors related to the job, occupation, or workplace.  
• Environmental Factors are extrinsic influences or factors from the surrounding systems 
that affect growth and development.  
• Human/Personal Factors are characteristics and intrinsic factors related to the 
psychological, social, physical, biological, and safety characteristics of a user and the 
system the user is in. 
• Organizational Factors are characteristics regarding safety climate and culture of the 
company, business, or association.  
Factors that affect safety, health, and may influence falls    
 The objective of the research is to identify the various factors influencing safety in the 
workplace (Sawacha, E., 1999). The health and safety of individuals are influenced by factors 
such as environmental, human, task, and organizational. The impacts of human, economical, 
psychological, technical, procedural, organizational, and the environmental issues are considered 
in terms of how these factors are linked with the level of safety. The human factor is 
characterized by the background and characteristics of the individual, such as age and 
experience. The economic factor is determined by the monetary values which are associated with 
safety such as, hazard pay. The psychological factor is assessed by the safety behavior of fellow 
workers on site including supervisors. The technical and procedural factors are assessed by the 
provision of training and handling of safety equipment on site.  
 The organizational and environmental factors are portrayed as the type of policy that the 
management adapts to the specific site safety. Information regarding these factors was correlated 
with accidents' records in a sample of 120 operatives. Results of the factor analysis suggest that 
variables related to the ‘organization policy' are the most dominant group of factors influencing 
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safety performance in the United Kingdom Construction Industry (Sawacha et al., 1999). The 
following table portrays various risk factors that affect safety, health, and could possibly lead to 
falls.  
Factors affecting health and safety at work 
Table 3: Risk Factors affecting safety and health 
(Sawacha et al., 1999)  
Environmental Factors 
1. Heating: heat stroke, cramps, low temperature 
2. Poor lighting: headache, eye strains 
3. Dust: Pneumoconiosis, silicosis 
4. Noise: deafness, affects concentration 
Occupational Factors 
1. Butchers and carpenters - risk of cutting 
2. Cleaners and food handlers - risk of contact dermatitis 
3. Store keepers and health careers - risk of back strain 
Note: When hazards are not obvious for certain jobs the risks are still there. 
Human Factors 
1. Need for proper training and supervision 
2. Risk to health and safety - untrained, unwell, carelessness 
3. Employees - responsible for own behavior 
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 Environmental Factors  
 The objective of the study is to examine the characteristics of patient falls during 
hospitalization in 1998 and compare them with those in the period 1978-1981 (Kerzman et al., 
2004). The occurrence of patient falls in a hospital environment is a major concern in any health 
care system. Research findings have reported the risk factors for these falls are age, gender, 
certain medications, mental status, chronic diseases, and environmental factors. Falls may lead to 
fear, pain, slight or severe injuries, increase the duration of hospital stay, cause patient 
discomfort, and affect quality of life. A retrospective study was performed in a large, 2000-bed 
medical center in Israel. Reports of 711 fall incidents in 1998 were compared with 328 reports in 
1978-1981. Information gathered included age, gender, department, work schedules, severity of 
injury, tests and treatment after injury. This information is used a risk factors to used in a tool for 
fall mitigation. The results showed that the rates of falls per 1000 admissions in psychiatric, elder 
care and rehabilitation departments in 1998 were significantly higher than in the earlier period. 
Rates of 115, 91, 85, respectively, per 1000 admissions were reported in 1998 compared with 34, 
9, 19, respectively, in the period 1978-1981. The percentage of reported falls in the younger age 
group (under 50) was higher in the later survey (1998), and a higher proportion occurred outside 
the patient's room. Most of the reported falls in 1998 occurred during the morning shift. In 
conclusion, the increased number of falls could be an outcome of increased environmental 
awareness (Kerzman et al, 2004).  
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Human Factors  
 Age is a human factor that that may lead to falls. Falling itself is not a diagnosis but a 
symptom of multiple risk factors and the effect of certain medications of homeostasis and 
environmental hazards that hinder safe mobility. Preventing falls requires a systematic diagnostic 
approach focused on identifying and reducing risk factors. Specific preventive strategies include 
treating underlying medical conditions, establishing a risk assessment, prescribing an exercise 
program to improve mobility, or removing fall hazards in the workplace (Tideikssar, R., 1996). 
 Human factors included age, gender, experience, and the use of personal protective 
equipment (PPE). Accident scenarios were extracted from accident reporting system. Scenarios 
in NASA Ground Support Operations A trend was found between causes for the falls and 
accident events. Falls from scaffold staging were associated with a lack of complying scaffolds 
and bodily action. Falls through existing floor openings were associated with unguarded 
openings, inappropriate protections, or the removal of protections. Falls from building girders or 
other structural steel were associated with bodily actions and improper use of PPE. Falls from 
ladders were associated with overexertion and unusual control of tools. Falls down stairs were 
associated with unguarded openings. Falls while jumping to a lower floor and falls through 
existing roof openings were associated with poor work practices. Primary and secondary 
prevention measures can be used to prevent falls or to mitigate the consequences of falls and are 
suggested for each type of accident. Primary prevention measures would include fixed barriers, 
such as handrails, guardrails, surface opening protections, and strong roofing materials. As a 
result, protection measures would include travel restraint systems, fall arrest systems, and fall 
containment systems (Chi et al., 2005). 
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 Human factors research in other high-risk fields such as patient care has demonstrated the 
rigorous study of risk factors effect on task performance.  The research can lead to improved 
outcome and reduced errors after redesign system of tasks. These methods have been applied to 
the anesthesia work environment. The data obtained in the experiment utilize task analysis, 
workload assessment during actual patient care, and the use of cognitive task analysis to study 
clinical decision making. A novel concept of "non-routine events" is introduced and pilot data 
are presented. In concluding, the awareness of human factors that affect system safety and falls 
can lead to fall mitigation.  
Organizational Factors  
 Managing Dynamic Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) and maintaining a safe environment 
must be simultaneous efforts to produce a successful organization. The objective of the NPP 
study was to develop a system dynamics model to assess the organizational and human factors 
which contribute to nuclear safety. The dynamic model portrays cause and effect relationships 
among factors and quantifies these factors. The variables in the model are degree of leadership, 
human resources, number of employees, workload and not just hardware in each department. The 
universal user can simulate various situations in nuclear power plant organization. The 
simulation is so intuitive that it assists with the improvements to safety and provides managerial 
tools for the organizational and human factors. In concluding, the model can portray how 
organizational and management policies affect individual performance such as productivity, 
quality of work, and ultimately NPP safety (Ahn, N., Jae, M., Yu, J., 2004).   
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System Safety  
 The NPP environment is very similar to NASA environment. Both organizations are 
dynamic because of the type of tasks that need to accomplish. Safety is very important to both 
organizations. The work environments are characterized by continuous change, progress, and 
activity. For example, at NASA Ground Support Operations, there are several workers involved 
to complete a task. These human factors can lead to falls because the demand is high and supply 
is low. These kinds of organizations are schedule driven and leadership influenced.   
System Safety refers to the extent to which individuals and group will commit to personal 
responsibility for safety, learn from mistakes, modify behavior, and be rewarded in these efforts. 
Safety Climate,” is the temporal state measure of safety culture, subject to commonalities among 
individual perceptions of the organization.” It refers to the perception about safety at a particular 
place and time. The climate is subject to change depending on the current environment.  
 The NASA Agency and the organizational structure are dynamic. System safety includes 
the total range of risk management. High risks are detrimental to NASA success. When 
considering communication and leadership, it was stated, “In an interview shortly after he 
became Center Director at KSC, Jim Kennedy suggested that most important cultural issue the 
Shuttle program is establishing a feeling of openness and honesty with all employees where 
everybody’s voice is valued (CAIB, ibid, p. 108).” NASA employees need to feel secure about 
reporting concerns and taking the appropriate action. Ultimately, employees should be given 
respect. There is a gap between vision and reality. The first priority at NASA is safety. However, 
the operational practices have deviated from the standards due to political stress, social factors, 
cultural factors, and organizational factors. Each center, program, projects, group, division, and 
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various engineering disciplines have their own subculture. This may negatively impact the 
overall culture of the organization. “If eternal vigilance is the price of liberty, then chronic 
unease is the price of safety." stated James Reason, Managing the Risk of Organizational 
Accidents (Leveson, N., 2004). 
Safety risk: NASA Scorecard  
The NASA Safety Risk Scorecard is a tool to assess risks at NASA. The NASA risk 
scorecard includes a 5 x 5 matrix in Figure 29. The research involves assessing risk factors that 
lead to falls in NASA ground support operations. Falls are part of system safety at NASA. The 
NASA Safety scorecard will be conveyed and compared to the fuzzy AHP model in this 
research. Showing a correlation between the fuzzy AHP model and the NASA Safety Risk 
scorecard is the quantitative approach to the research. The fuzzy AHP model and the NASA risk 








Table 4: Risk Factors affecting the organization 







Level of Hierarchy  Attributes        
  Organizational Culture  Staff Capacity  Plant Condition  Workload  
Top Managers  Attitude Leadership Morale        
Middle Managers  Attitude        
  Supervision        
  Time allocation        
  Number of MM  Productivity  Number of Defects  
Spent time to dealt 
with work  
  Education Etc.  Quality of work  Defect generation rate Administration task  
Employees    Skill level  Parts  Maintenance task  
(Operation Engineering Maintenance Coordination)    Spent time to dispose of task  Etc.  Etc.  
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Task Factors  
Task-delineated safety (TDS) is a behavior-based safety management program developed 
in order to address the significant problems of slip, trip and fall accidents (Quintana, R, 1999). 
The hypothesis of this approach is that hazards can be minimized if personnel are held directly 
accountable with clear task delineation for keeping an area safe. Role ambiguity would be 
minimized which lead to a safe environment. Management's role in providing feedback and 
enforcement is imperative to the success of the safety management program. This hypothesis was 
analyzed by focusing on slip, trip and fall hazards at used-clothes sorting facility, with a history 
of slip, trip and fall accidents costing the company approximately two million US dollars in the 
past 3 years. The slip, trip and fall hazard density was significantly lower using this TDS 
approach (Quintana, R., 1999). 
There are some implications in the literature regarding risk factors that contribute to falls. 
A faulty assumption is if a worker slips or trips, they will automatically fall. This is not always 
the case. According to the literature, the premise is that a cause of fall is a slip and trip. However, 
a fallacy is that slips, trips, and falls are in the same category, have similar causes and effects, 
and can be mitigated in the same manner. According to literature and technical reports, each 
incident is different and should be treated accordingly.  
The following table contains multiple risk factors that contribute to the falls in General 
work environment and specifically in the aerospace environment. The following risk factors 
were observed multiple times (reoccurrence or three or more) in the literature. According to the 
literature, the following table contains significant risk factors that lead to falls. The studies show 
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there are multiple sources for falls. It has been observed that causes for falls are dependent on the 
work environment. There similar trends and information in the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 
Data, Liberty Mutual Data, Mishap Data, Incident Reporting Information System (IRIS), 
Empirical Studies, and NASA/Gravitec Fall Hazard Analysis Report. A general concern is a 
combination of the risk factors that contribute to falls. Table 5 is a comparative analysis of 
multiple risk factors that contribute to falls in the workplace. The list is not conclusive but it is a 


















Table 5: Multiple risk factors that contribute to falls  
 
General Work Environment 
 
Aerospace Environment (NASA Ground 
Support Operations) 
 
• Experience (OF) 
• Job and Safety 
Program (OF) 
• Type of 
Task/Activity (TF) 
• Sex/Gender (HF) 
• Load weight (TF) 
• Environmental 
Conditions (EF) 
• Task Duration  (TF) 
• Slip and Trip (HF) 
• Environmental 
Surface (EF) 
• Slip and Trip (HF) 
• Poor Lighting (EF) 




• Coefficient of 
Friction (EF) 
• Time of Day for the 
fall (EF)   
• Coefficient of 
Friction (EF) 
• Fall Distance (EF) 
• Age (HF) 
 
 
• Worker Interference 
(HF) 
• Number of Workers 
(HF) 
• Age (HF)  
• Fall Distance (EF) 
• Environmental 
Conditions (EF) 
• Environmental Surface 
(EF) 
• Task Duration (TF)   
• Task Frequency (TF)  
• Task Proximity (TF)  
• Fall  Hazard Severity 
(OF) 
• Fall Hazard Protection 
(OF) 





OF-Organizational Factor  
EF-Environmental Factor  
TF-Task Related Factor  






The focus of this research will be on multiple risk factors that contribute to falls in NASA 
Ground Support Operations. The following are the multiple risk factors that lead to falls in a 
dynamic aerospace environment. The benchmark for risk factor selection was by strategically 
observing three or more occurrences of the each risk factor in the NASA Fall Hazard Report and 
NASA Mishap Data. The following are the risk factors’ definitions that contribute to falls in 
NASA Ground Support Operations.  
Human/Personal Factors 
• Worker Interference: the effect multiple workers at the same location have on each other 
and the interference of each worker's movements in the work environment. 
• Number of workers: the number of workers at the location  
• Age: the (average) age of the workers at the location  
Environmental Factors  
• Fall Distance: height of fall  
• Environmental Surface: the security of the platform, structure, or surface that 
 supports the worker  
• Environmental Conditions: measurement of work being performed in an inside or  outside 
work environment  
 
Organizational Factors 
• Fall Hazard Severity: severity and consequence of the fall hazard that is related to the 
height of the fall in the organization being analyzed 
• Fall Hazard Protection: measurement of the existing fall protection quality at the 
facility/organization being analyzed  
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• Fall Hazard Occurrence: how often the particular fall hazard is found at the 
facility/organization being analyzed 
Task Factors 
• Task Frequency: how frequently workers perform the task and exposed to a fall hazard  
 
• Task Duration: how long workers spend at the location performing the task and the 
number of man hours exposed to the fall hazard 
 
• Task Proximity: measurement of how close the workers normally get to the fall hazard 
while performing the task  
  
 The Ishikawa “Fishbone” Diagram was used as the conceptual model to represent falls. 
The following conceptual model is a graphic tool that helps identify, sort, and display possible 
causes of a problem or quality characteristic. The cause and effect diagram display the number of 
errors for the various risk factors that contribute to falls. There are extrinsic and intrinsic factors 
that contribute to falls. Extrinsic factors are characteristics from the outside.  Intrinsic factors are 
original causes and characteristics within the human body.  The extrinsic factors are 
organizational and environmental. The intrinsic factors are human/personal and task related.  
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Fall Hazard Severity   
Environmental Factors
     Fall Distance 
Human/Personal Factors 
Age
Task Related Factors 
Task Duration 
Environmental Conditions Extrinsic Factors 
Intrinsic Factors 
Fall Hazard Protection  
  
Task Frequency Worker Interference 
Number of Workers 
Environmental Surface 
Task Proximity  
Fall Hazard Occurrence   
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Fall Studies by industry 
Falls in Healthcare 
The objective of the study is to examine how risk factors influence the satisfaction, 
health, safety, and well-being of health care workers (Lundstrom et al., 2002). Ultimately, these 
factors affect the satisfaction, safety, and quality of care for patients. In addition, the impact of 
the work environment on tasks and the effects on health care workers and patients. Studies have 
shown where falls are major concern in healthcare because medical facilities are dynamic work 
environments just like an aerospace environment. Therefore, people are performing high risk 
tasks such as doctors and nurses handling and lifting disabled patients. Studies focusing on 
worker health and safety concerns affected by the organization and the physical work 
environment provide evidence of direct positive and/or adverse effects on performance and 
suggest indirect effects on the quality of patient care. An increasing number of studies are 
reviewing the relationship between improvement in organizational factors and changes in patient 
outcomes. Characteristics or risks in hospitals are observed as one model for improving safety. In 
conclusion, the observance of characteristics of fall is important to fall mitigation (Lundstrom et 
al., 2002). 
Falls in the construction industry  
 Fall-related occupational injuries and fatalities are a major problem in the U.S. 
construction industry. Two Bureau of Labor Statistics databases-Censuses of Fatal Occupational 
Injuries and Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses-were examined for 1992-2000. A total 
of 605 fall-through fatalities occurred during 1992-2000. The costs estimates were in a range of 
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$55,000-$76,000 for the total cost of a 1998 fall injuries. Current work practices and fall 
protection equipment have reduced the frequency and costs of fall-through incidents. 
Researchers can use a systems approach on these incidents to identify contributing risk factors. 
Employers and practitioners can alert managers and work crews about these dangerous locations 
to eliminate the fall hazards that are often obvious and easy to rectify (Bobick, T., 2004).   
 The construction industry is highly subject to occupational accidents. In Norway there is 
little research-based knowledge on accident pattern and risk factors (Gravseth, et al., 2006). The 
main objective of the study was to examine studies of accidents in this industry, leading to 
injuries registered by the health services, could identify preventable risk factors and preventive 
measures.  Fifty accidents in the construction industry led to serious personal injuries. Patients 
were interviewed after treatment in emergency wards and hospitals. Inspections of the accident 
sites were performed. Subject matter experts (SMEs) discussed the accidents in order to identify 
risk factors and suggest preventive measures. The accident reports in the study were compared to 
reports from the Labor Inspectorate on the same accidents. The investigation identified several 
risk factors. Several detailed preventive measures were proposed. Results showed that more than 
one third of the respondents said that time pressure had contributed to the accident. Accident risk 
caused by time pressure can be reduced by avoiding fragmented contracts, unrealistic time limits, 
and the use of day penalties for breach of contract. Possible preventive measures for electric 
injuries imply modification of the reporting system and of the work organization so that workers 
can comply with the regulations more easily (Gravseth et al., 2006).   
  The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) investigate most worker-
related fatalities. A research study was conducted that focused on the data OSHA accumulated 
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on construction worker accidents involving falls. In the construction industry, falls are the major 
sources of accidents resulting in fatalities (Huang et al., 2003). The purpose of the study was to 
identify the root causes of fall accidents and to identify any additional information that might be 
helpful in reducing the incidence of construction worker falls in the future. Data used in the 
study was from January 1990 through October 2001. However, the last 5 years of this time 
interval was important because this is a period when more data was accumulated and recorded in 
the OSHA investigation reports. Results show that most fall accidents take place at elevations of 
less than 9.15 m (30 ft), occurring primarily on new construction projects of commercial 
buildings and residential projects of relatively low construction cost. In addition, experience does 
not seem to diminish accident occurrence. Workers often misjudge fall hazards. Most of all, the 
results show that fall accidents account for a growing proportion of the total number of 
construction worker fatalities (Huang X. and Hinze, J., 2003).  
The purpose of the study was to develop a method to evaluate the relationship between 
slip resistance measurements and slips and falls (Hanson et al, 1999). The prediction of falls was 
based on the surface area. There were five subjects wearing a safety harnesses walked down a 
ramp at various angles such as 0º, 10º, and 20º. The different surface areas were tile or carpeted 
surface under dry, wet, or soapy conditions. The coefficient of friction of footwear, floor surface, 
and contaminant interfaces were measured. The friction was assessed by examining the foot 
forces during walking trials when no slips occurred. The results showed that the number of slip 
and fall incidents increased as the difference between the required coefficient of friction (COF) 
and the measured dynamic coefficient of friction increased. The developed regression model was 
developed to show the significant factors contributing to slips and falls. This type of model can 
 36
be used to evaluate various work environments and assist in the design of safer work 
environments (Hanson et al., 1999).  
Figure 9 is the adjustable platform used to set the ramp angle known as the optical data 
collection trigger (ODCT). The subject is wearing a harness system to prevent fall injury during 













Figure 9: Coefficient of Friction 
(Hanson et al., 1999)  
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The purpose of the study was to identify the factors that contribute to slips, trips, and falls 
occurring during the delivery of mail. Previous analysis of data consists of approximately 1700 
fall incidents. About one-fifth of falls occurred on steps. The experimental methods include 
interviews with safety management, group discussion with delivery employees, and survey for 
employee and managers. The results showed that risk factors related to task, behavior, footwear, 
and equipment contribute to falls. In addition, working practices such as reading the mailing 
address while walking caused falls. Figure 10 shows that some of the organizational factors that 
contribute to falls were management safety activities, adverse weather conditions, management 













Figure 10: Fall Risk factors during Mail Delivery 
(Bentley et al, 1998)  
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 Falls cause important and financial costs, as regards workers (Leamon and Murphy, 
1995). The mechanism of a fall can be described as follows: imbalance (slips, trips, etc.), attempt 
at equilibrium recovery and, in the event of failure, fall with eventual injuries (Leclercq, 1997). 
Falls are reoccurring occupational incidents in the workplace.  
The falls lead to imperative social and economic issues for the employee and employer. 
Various factors such as environmental and personal factors that affect the balance control of an 
individual. The factors involved in the study focus on environmental, task, and personal. Having 
knowledge of intrinsic and extrinsic factors contributing to falls could be beneficial to 
environmental plan, safer occupational conditions for employees and use of balance 
rehabilitation procedures to reduce fall hazards (Gauchard et al., 2001). 
 
Fall Hazards in the aircraft maintenance industry 
 Falls are significant occupational hazards, particularly in industries with dynamic work 
environments. The following study describes rates of noncompliance with fall hazard prevention 
requirements, perceived safety climate, employee knowledge, beliefs, and the association 
between fall exposure and safety climate measures in commercial aircraft maintenance activities. 
The method includes walkthrough observations on aircraft mechanics at two participating sites.  
The methods involve asserting the degree of noncompliance and completing questionnaires 
concerning fall hazard knowledge, personal safety beliefs, and safety climate. The survey results 
were summarized into safety climate and belief scores by workgroup and site. Noncompliance 
rates observed during walkthroughs were compared to the climate-belief scores, and were 
expected to be inversely proportional.   As a result, important differences were seen in fall safety 
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performance between the sites. The study provided a characterization of aircraft maintenance fall 
hazards. Noncompliance varied by height, equipment used, location of work on the aircraft, shift, 
and by safety system. Employees with higher safety climate scores had greater observed 
noncompliance within each site. Ultimately, the use of engineered safety systems had a 
significant impact on working safely. The results of this study indicated that safety systems are 
very important in reducing noncompliance with fall protection requirements in aircraft 
maintenance facilities. Site-level fall safety compliance was found to be related to safety climate 
(Nietzel et al., 2008). 
 
Approaches to mitigate falls  
 The purpose of this perspective article is to describe the use of a physiological profile 
approach to falls risk assessment and prevention that has been developed by the Falls and 
Balance Research Group of the Prince of Wales Medical Research Institute, Sydney, Australia 
(Lord, S., 2003). The profile’s use for people with a variety of factors that put them at risk for 
falls is discussed. The Physiological Profile Assessment (PPA) involves a series of simple tests 
of vision, peripheral sensation, muscle force, reaction time, and postural sway. The tests can be 
administered with the proper portable equipment. The results can be used to differentiate people 
who are at risk for falls (“fallers”) from people who are not at risk for falls (“nonfallers”). A 
computer program using data from the PPA can be used to assess an individual’s performance in 
relation to a normative database so that deficits can be targeted for intervention. The PPA 
provides valid, numerical, and reliable measurements that can be used for assessing falls risk and 
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evaluating the effectiveness of interventions and is suitable for use in a range of physical therapy 
















Figure 11: Physiological Profile Assessment  
(Lord et al., 2003)  
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The following risk graph is for a 79 year old woman. It is confirmed that for a 79 year old 
woman, the fall risk is mild. The normal age range is 20 to 99 years. The graphs shows that falls 
are the effect (y) and age is the cause (x). Therefore, falls are dependent on age. The PPA output 
is the following: graph of the overall risk score, profile of the individual’s test performances, 
table of the test performances versus age, and the written report containing results and 
recommendations.  
 
Figure 12: Fall Risk versus Age 




Fuzzy Models in Risk Assessment  
 
The objective of the research was to develop a fuzzy analytic hierarchy process (AHP) 
model for behavior-based safety management. Safety management (SM) is a very important 
element within an effective manufacturing organization. One of the most important components 
of SM is to maintain the safety of work systems in the workplace. Safety of work systems is a 
function of many factors which affect the system. Numerous factors affect the safety of work 
systems simultaneously. As a result, measuring work system safety needs a comprehensive 
approach. In this study, the work safety issue is studied through the analytic hierarchy process 
(AHP) approach which allows both multi-faceted and simultaneous assessment. The real 
problem can be represented in a more compatible way by using fuzzy numbers instead of crisp 
numbers to evaluate the risk factors. A fuzzy AHP approach is proposed to determine the level of 
faulty behavior risk (FBR) in work systems. The proposed method is applied in a real 
manufacturing company. Risk factors causing faulty behavior are weighted with triangular fuzzy 
numbers in pairwise comparisons. The risk factors are evaluated based on the work system by 
using the relative weights and fuzzy linguistic variables. As a result of this evaluation, FBR 
levels of work systems are determined. Finally, faulty behavior is prevented before occurrence 
and work system safety is improved (Dagdeviren, M., 2008).  
 The object of the study was the development of the global economy and the ease of air 
transportation have flight safety (Hsia, T., 2008).  There are exact specifications and procedures 
in the operation and maintenance of aircraft. Human errors and mechanical disorders are two key 
risk factors of flight safety. The employees need to follow an outlined procedure to avoid human 
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errors and ensure flight safety. Readability of aircraft maintenance technical orders can affect the 
quality and reliability of aircraft maintenance. To ensure the editing quality of technical orders, 
monitoring the number of unreadable sentences is important and necessary. The number of 
unreadable sentences found in a technical order was used as the measure of readability 
performance (RP) as well as a readability performance index was provided to evaluate whether 
the RP of individual readability characteristics of technical orders was adequate Different 
readability characteristics make different grade of RP loss. Based on fuzzy multiple criteria 
decision-making (Fuzzy MCDM) approaches, the SMES ranked and calculated the weights of all 
factors. Simultaneously, the experts proposed the upper limits of unreadable sentences according 
to the weights of individual readability characteristics. The technical orders issued by Taiwan 
Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation was used as an example to evaluate the 
readability of the technical orders and total RP losses for individual readability characteristics. 
Finally, an improved way of editing quality for technical orders was recommended (Hsia, T., 
2008). 
There is similar approach used to predict Cumulative Trauma Disorders (CTDs). The 
objective of the research was used to develop a prediction equation using fuzzy quantification 
theory following categorical risk factors: task, personal, and organizational. Fuzzy set theory 
provided a quantitative method for analyzing vague and imprecise information.  A three part 
methodology was used including the identification of risk factors, analytical hierarchy process 
(AHP), risk factor qualification and quantification. Subject Matter Experts were asked to identify 
and classify risk factors as well as identify exposure limits.  Also, they were asked to rank levels 
of each factor as minimal, mild, moderate, strong, and very strong risk.  AHP was utilized to 
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assign relative weight to each risk factor and each risk factor category.  Using a population of 
diagnosed CTDS and non-CTDS hands, the developed model was used to determine its 
reliability and sensitivity.  The results found the model to be a good predictor of CTDS because 
it quantified the risk factors that lead to CTDs. Therefore, CTDS could be mitigated and 
prevented (McBell P, Crumpton-Young L, 1997). The model was comprehensive and holistic 
approach that included several characteristics of CTDS.  The subject matter experts have tested 
the model and it was confirmed a valid approach for CTDs analysis. A similar approach will be 
used to quantify and evaluate risk factors that influence falls in this current study. 
 Fuzzy Set Theory (FST) is a modeling technique frequently used where vague concepts 
and imprecise data are handled, and it is capable of managing both imprecision and uncertainty 
data (Bonisson, 1980). FST has been used for the development of the linguistic approach where 
any variable is treated as a linguistic variable (i.e. Low, Medium, and High). FST can be used to 
translate linguistic terms into numeric values to be used to get aggregate measures when given 
several inputs. FST characterizes the concept of approximation based on membership functions 
with a range between 0 and 1, which provides the lower and upper approximations of a concept 
(Yao et al., 1992). Zimmerman identifies the necessity to use mathematical language to map 
several membership functions and develop FST models.  
 On the contrary, the use of mathematical modeling techniques brings some limitations. 
Real situations are not often precise, and the description of a real system often requires more 
detailed data than a human being could ever recognize simultaneously (Schwartz, 1962 and 
Zimmermann, 1991). FST provides a good starting point in the development of a conceptual 
basis and can be utilized in the field of pattern classification (Zadeh, 1965). FST also provides a 
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rigorous mathematical framework in which ambiguous data can be precisely studied 
(Zimmermann, 1991).  
Probability theory has been traditionally used for describing the phenomenon of 
uncertainty; it deals with the expectation of future events based on something known. However, 
the uncertainty represented by fuzziness is not the expectation of uncertainty; rather it is the 
uncertainty resulting from the imprecision of a concept expressed by a linguistic term. 
Probability is the theory of random events and the likelihood of events (Klir, G. J et al., 1997).  
Traditional modeling techniques tend to eliminate factors which cannot be explained.  
This process leads to inaccurate models caused by lost data. In order to develop a model that 
displays factors that contribute to falls, FST was selected as the most feasible technique to 
quantify these factors. Furthermore, linguistic approaches have been previously applied and 
developed for use in FST, allowing factor variables to be represented as numerical values. One 
of the most important advantages of using this technique is the opportunity to create a scale to 
measure the factors that contribute to falls. The method is compatible with the current research 
because the final results involve a qualitative and quantitative multifaceted model; that will be 
used to predict falls in an aerospace environment.  The technique will be used to quantify risk 
factors that contribute to falls in NASA Ground Support Operations.  
Subject Matter Experts (SMEs)  
SMEs can be used to determine the relative weights of factor variables and assist in the 
development of FST models. There are different ways to develop membership functions that 
include direct methods (experts giving answers to various kinds of questions) and indirect 
methods (experts are more general and less biased questions). This approach is beneficial for 
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multi-faceted models. The use of SMEs can assist in the quantification of qualitative 
performance measures (Klir, Y., 1995; Terrano et al., 1992)..  
 
Models and tools for assessing risks and falls  
 The majority of fatal accidents in the construction industry are caused by falling from 
heights. Investigators emphasize the importance of safety control, carried out systematically and 
based on real-time data collection, as the most important element of accident prevention. An 
automated model to monitor and control fall hazards was developed (Navon, R, Kolton, O, 
2007). The model identifies the activities associated with risk of falls from heights and protective 
measure such as guardrails. The model is designed to follow up the existing guardrails and 
constantly compare their locations and lengths to the planned ones. Based on this comparison, 
the model issues warnings whenever guardrails are missing, or temporarily removed. The model 
provides reports and warnings. The reports are used for planning the materials, or employees, 
needed to establish the protective measures. The model's main algorithms portray dangerous 
activities and areas that were identified. But the proposed model was developed only to improve 
safety during the construction stage. However, including safety in the design stage can improve 
safety culture during the actual construction (Navon, R., Kolton, O., 2007). 
The method of engineering risk analysis is based on a functional analysis of systems and 
on the probabilities of the events and random variables that affect their performances. These 
methods allow identification of a system's failure modes, computation of its probability of failure 
or performance deterioration per time unit or operation, and the contribution of each component 
to the probabilities and consequences of failures. The model includes the human decisions and 
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actions that affect components' performances and the management factors that affect behaviors. 
Therefore, these factors are the root causes of system failures. By computing the risk with and 
without proposed measures, one can then set priorities among different risk management options 
under resource constraints. In this study, the engineering risk analysis method is used to identify 
a system's weaknesses and the most cost-effective way to fix them. The first example concerns 
the heat shield of the space shuttle orbiter and shows the relative risk contribution of the tiles in 
different areas of the orbiter's surface. The second application is to patient risk in anesthesia and 
demonstrates how the engineering risk analysis method can be used in the medical domain to 
rank the benefits of risk mitigation measures, in that case, mostly organizational. The third 
application is a model of seismic risk analysis and mitigation, with application to the San 
Francisco Bay area for the assessment of the costs and benefits of different seismic provisions of 
building codes. The probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) method allowed identifying system 
weaknesses and the most cost-effective way to fix them (Pate- Cornell, E., 2002). 
 The objective of the research is to establish fall prevention procedures (Navon, R., and 
Kolton, O., 2006). The construction industry is very dynamic and prone to risks. As a result, not 
enough time and effort are invested in safety issues. Fall from heights is the main cause for 
fatalities and injuries in construction projects. The automated model developed identifies the 
dangerous activities in the project's schedule. Additionally, it constantly compares the planned 
guardrails (location and time) and the ones actually used oil site. The model provides 
textual/graphical reports and warns when guardrails are missing, are incomplete or have been 
misplaced. The model was implemented, tested in a real time project, and presented to 14 experts 
who were asked to evaluate and validate it. The main conclusions were the model is accurate, 
 48
enables early detection of fall hazards before and during design and construction stage, the 
model is an important managerial, monitoring, and control tool keeping track of all fall hazards 
and protective measures, and warns when a safety problem (Navon, R., and Kolton, O., 2006). 
 Decision analysis is a useful tool for risk management. There are several methods used 
such as probabilistic techniques to assess the accident risk.  Decisions made by organizational 
leadership may affect the likelihood of an accident. Therefore, managerial and organizational 
factors should be included in the risk modeling process. However, various analytic techniques 
are not commonly used to understand the decisions that are made by these individuals. A 
framework of value-focused thinking is used in order to understand the safety decisions made 
within the research partner organization. The research describes the results of interviews held 
with managers and employees from this organization. Through these interviews, we sought to 
understand the values these experts apply in their roles within the organization and the objectives 
they seek to achieve and contribute to its overall safety performance. The final analysis is a 
framework that portrays the fundamental objectives of safe operations for various roles in the 
organization and connects these different decisions (Merrick et al., 2005). Decision analysis is 
essential to fall mitigation. For example, the leaders and subject matter experts play a major role 
by making decisions for employee in regards to fall prevention. In addition, the management 




Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP)  
 
Hierarchical classifications can help show relationships among categories. This research 
has created a hierarchical category system where taxonomies were developed by organizing data 
into different levels. In order to evaluate the feasibility of the categories and ratings, subject 
matter experts were asked to review the relative weights obtained through AHP. Pair-wise 
comparisons are frequently used to determine the relative importance of each factor. 
Comparisons are made within modules to determine the relationship between the factors 
identified by the experts (Saaty, 1990). A rating scale was developed and utilized for 
comparisons where each pair wise comparison is rated on a scale from 1 to 9. In an AHP 
analysis, the rating is used to define the degree of preference of one factor over another. The 
value 1 represents equal importance of the two factors, X and Y, and the value 9 suggests X is 
more important than Y. The inverse of the values is used if the expert considers that an inverse 
relationship exists among the factors. Once the pair-wise matrix is developed, the relative 
weights are obtained from the estimate of the maximum eigenvector of the matrix. The 
normalized average weighting indicates the relative significance of each factor.  
The AHP approach, which consists of a series of goals, criteria, and alternatives, 
simplifies a complex problem into simple pair-wise comparisons. AHP is very useful in complex 
decision-making, and plethora of software have been developed which assists with the 
development of AHP, such as Expert Choice (Saaty, 1990). Pair-wise comparison is a problem-
solving technique used to determine the relative order or ranking of a group of items resulting in 
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a specific point value. Expert Choice was selected for this research. The following ratings were 
used to develop the forms to be sent to all the SME.  
Inconsistency Ratio  
 
Furthermore, research performed by McCauley-Bell and Badiru used knowledge 
acquisition to obtain factor relevance (McCauley-Bell et al., 1996). The scale to develop 
membership functions was developed using the described approach in this research. 
The inconsistency ratio is used to evaluate the SMEs’ ability to make consistent judgments. The 
ratio identifies if the SMEs are cognizant or forget previous assessments across the activity. The 
presence of inconsistency indicates that a SME is not coherent or that he or she does not 
understand the assessment tool. The inconsistency ratio that is smaller than 0.1 reflects a 
coherent SME. Therefore, inconsistency ratios those are greater than 0.1 represent a concern 
(Hallowell, 2007). A series of pair-wise ratio-based comparisons were performed to evaluate 
SMEs’ understanding of falls. This ratio was calculated by evaluating if the whole set of pair-
wise comparisons was done consistently.   
Conclusion  
The literature review identified the research need to develop a fuzzy analytical hierarchy 
process model to evaluate factors that contribute to falls in NASA Ground Support Operations. 
The need to develop a holistic model capable of evaluating a large number of key factors that 
lead to falls is essential for all work environments. Therefore, a series of tools, methods, and 
techniques are in conjunction with the development of fuzzy AHP model that has been 
identified. The following sections cover in detail the proposed approach to solve the complex 
mathematical modeling problem including qualitative and quantitative data. There was a plethora 
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of literature on falls. The literature was partitioned into subcomponents such as system safety, 




Table 6: Literature Review Summary 
Topics  
System 
Safety  Falls  
Task 
Related  Organizational  Environmental  Human/Personal   
Fall Risk Assessments and 
Models   AHP  Fuzzy Models  
Authors                    
Tinetti, 1988   X         X     
Leamon & Murphy, 1995   X         X     
Maynard, 2002    X               
Nietzel, 2008    X               
Bobick, TG., 2004   X               
Leveson, N,  2005 X X               
Bentley, T., 2009   X X X     X     
Gauchard, 1999   X     X   X     
Hanson, 2001   X     X         
Bentley & Haslam, 1998   X   X           
Ahn, Jae, 2003   X   X           
Salazar, M., 2005   X   X           
Hisao, 2008   X       X       
Davis, 1983   X       X X     
Lord, S., 2003   X       X X     
Dagdeviren, M., 2008               X X 
McCauley-Bell, C-Y, 
Baidur, 1997               X X 
Saaty, 1990               X   
Hallowell, 2007               X    
Schwartz, 1962                 X 
Terrano, 1994                 X  
Zimmermann, 1991                 X  
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CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY 
 
Experiment Overview  
The purpose of the experiment is to develop a model that represents linguistic variables to 
quantify and rank risk factors that contribute to falls. The variables are quantified using fuzzy set 
theory. As a result, the model will evaluate the qualitative and quantitative data. (Zimmermann, 
1991). 
Research Variables  
• Dependent Variable: Fall (Effect)  
• Independent Variable: Risk factors that contribute to falls such as task related, 
human/personal, environmental, organizational (Multiple Causes)   
 
Research Hypothesis  
The following are research hypotheses, which include the null and the alternative.  
H0: The development of a conceptual model that characterizes risk factors can be useful 
in reducing the likelihood of falls in NASA Ground Support Operations.  
H1: The development of a conceptual model that characterizes risk factors cannot be 
useful in reducing the likelihood of falls in NASA Ground Support Operations.  
H0: A fuzzy analytical hierarchy process model can be developed to predict the 
likelihood of falls in NASA Ground Support Operations.  
H1: A fuzzy analytical hierarchy process model cannot be developed to predict the 








1. What are the contributing risk factors that influence falls in the workplace? 
2. How do we quantify contributing risk factors that influence falls in NASA ground 
support operations?  
3. What is the total effect of these risk factors on falls?  




Research Phases  
The following are the twelve major research phases:  
1. Knowledge Acquisition: risk factors that contribute to falls are identified and classified.   
The first phase is to the development of taxonomy for multiple risk factors that 
contribute to fall (human/personal, task related, organizational, and environmental) to be 
evaluated. The taxonomies characterize categorical risk factors, sub risk factors, and 
factor variables affecting falls in the aerospace environment. The benchmark was to 
identify the significant factors by observing the repeatability three or more occurrences 
of risk factors in the literature review and compare it to the NASA/KSC Fall Hazard 
Report and NASA/KSC Incident Report Information System (McCauley-Bell, Baidur, 
1996).   
2. Data Collection: the following data including scenarios characteristics were collected 
from NASA/Kennedy Space Center Ground Support Operations Fall Hazard Report. 
The three scenarios are Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF), Launch Complex Payloads 
(LCP), and the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB). The definition of categorical factors 
have been was developed in order to avoid any misunderstanding of the key factors to 
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enhance the success and accuracy of the data collection process. NASA/KSC partnered 
with Gravitec, Inc. to facilitate the data collection process within NASA Ground Support 
Operations (NASA, 2005). The multiple risk factors in the following table that 
contribute to falls will be assessed by using the surveys and the NASA Safety Index in 
APPENDIX F. A taxonomy characterization has been developed for multiple risk 
factors that contribute to falls, which include sub factors and factors variables identified 
after performing an intensive literature review and fall hazard reports review. Table 7 
represents multiple risk factors that contribute to falls, factor variables, and metrics to be 
used for data collection in the research.  




variable Data Collection  
Equipment or Instrument 
Used 
Task Related Factors       
Task Frequency  Rating  visual observation  index 
Task Duration  Rating  visual observation  index  
Task Proximity  Rating  
tape measure/meter stick 
reading  meter stick/tape measure/index 
Environmental Factors        
Fall Distance feet/inches  
tape measure/meter stick 
reading  meter stick/tape measure/index 
Environmental Surface  Rating  visual observation  index  
Environmental 
Conditions  Rating  visual observation  index  
Human/Personal 
Factors        
Worker Interference  Rating  visual observation index  
Number of workers  Rating  visual observation index  
Age  Birth date  Birth date/Driver's License  Survey  
Organizational Factors       
Fall Hazard Severity  Rating  visual observation  index 
Fall Hazard Protection  Rating  visual observation  index  
Fall Hazard Occurrence  Rating  counting/visual observation  index  
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The data in the following table which includes the scenarios characteristics were collected from 
NASA/Kennedy Space Center Ground Support Operations and Gravitec Fall Hazard Report. 
Table 8: Scenario Characteristics 
Work Area  SLF   LCP  VAB   
Factor     
Task Duration  1.2-Medium  1.2-Medium  1.2 Medium  
Task Frequency  1.1-Monthly  1.3-Daily  1.4-Shift  
Task Proximity  1.2-Very close  1.2-Very close  1.2-Very close  
Fall Distance  100 ft.  60 ft.  500 ft.  
Environmental 
Conditions  
1.2-Extreme  1.0-Good  1.1 –Variable  
Environmental 
Surface  
1.1-Poor  0.9-Excellent  0.9 Excellent  
Age  32  47  25  
# of workers  1 worker  1 worker  3 workers  
Worker 
Interference  
1.0-Independent  1.0 Independent  1.2-Multiple  
Fall Occurrence   1.0-Unique  1.2-Common  1.2-Common  
Fall Severity    5.0-Extreme  5.0-Extreme  5.0-Extreme  
Fall Protection  0.75-Poor  1.0-None  0.75-Poor  
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3. SMEs interviews: The SMEs are representative of the environment being analyzed 
(pool of subjects). The SMES were selected based on the ability to answer the questions 
on the survey. The SMEs were selected based on experience/background and education 
(e.g. B.S. in Engineering/Technical/Safety Related Field and/or minimum of five years 
experience in Engineering/Technical/Safety Related Field). The SMEs were divided in 
teams that are evenly distributed for model validation. Six Subject Matters completed 
surveys using a voting system in NASA Expert Choice Team version. The SMES 
consisted of 2 Fall Protection Experts, 2 Human Factors Expert, and 2 Safety Engineer 
Experts. The voting system allows the SMES to make judgments simultaneously on risk 
factors using the fundamental pairwise scale (Saaty, 1990). 
4. Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP): Structure the decision model. AHP is a Process 
to analyze and structure a decision problem by prioritizing factors and alternatives 
(Saaty, 1990)  
5. Weight Validation: Testing the validity of the developed AHP model will be done by 
comparing the priority vectors.  The weight validation is justified by using the priority 
vector to validate the model by having two different sets of experts/decision makers 
create priority vectors separately. There will be three evenly distributed SMEs in each 
group.  If the resulting priority vectors of the two different sets of experts are similar and 
that will validate the weights in the model. Priority vector is average weight of each 
factor. If the results of both vectors are the same or close to each other, then the model is 
confirmed valid. The ratings in AHP are subjective; which can lead to inconsistencies. 
To level the discrepancies, a priority vector is calculated (Dagdeviren, M., 2008).  
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6. Fuzzification of Variables:  Fuzzy Set Theory (FST) has been used for the 
development of the linguistic approach where any variable is treated as a linguistic 
variable. In this research, the linguistic variables are Low, Medium, and High.  FST can 
be used to translate linguistic terminology into numeric values to be used to get 
aggregate measures when given many inputs (Bonisson, 1980). 
7. Membership Function Development: FST characterizes the concept of approximation 
based on membership functions with a range between 0 and 1, which provides the lower 
and upper approximations of a concept (Yao, Y.Y & Wong, S. K. M, 1992). 
8. Factor Qualification using Fuzzy Set Theory: In order to develop a model that 
displays risk factors that contribute to falls, FST was selected as the most feasible 
technique to quantify these risk factors (Zimmermann, 1991). 
9. Factor Quantification using Fuzzy Set Theory: Linguistic methods have been 
previously applied and developed for use in FST, allowing factor variables to be 
represented as numerical values (Zimmermann, 1991). 
10. Model Development: FST provided a basis for development of a conceptual model and 
can be utilized in the field of pattern classification (Zadeh, 1965).  Fuzzy Set Theory 
offered a mathematical framework in which unclear data can be accurately studied 
(Zimmermann, 1991).  
11. Model Usability:  Usability testing or usability practice is a technique used to evaluate a 
product, system, or even model by testing it on users. It is gives direct input on how real 
users use the system. Fifteen subjects were asked to apply fuzzy analytical hierarchy 
process model to three scenarios in NASA Ground Support Operations. The subjects 
 59
were fifteen engineers selected from UCF and NASA/KSC. The design of the 
experiment was a repeated measures analysis.  Therefore, the subjects’ responses 
(ratings of the three scenarios) were analyzed (Siegel, S., 1988).  
12.  Model Validation: In addition, the subjects were asked to evaluate the scenarios for the 
model validation. These predicted values from the SME regarding the scenarios were 
compared to the NASA accepted Scale for fall hazards. If the results of both models are 














 The following three scenarios were used in the model validation: Shuttle Landing Facility 
(SLF), Launch Complex Payloads (LCP), and Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB).   
 









Figure 13: Scenario 1 (Shuttle Landing Facility)  
 
 
Case Study: One worker at the age of 32 is required to conduct routine maintenance on the 
camera pictured in the red circle outside the Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF). At this site, there is 
no personal protection equipment. The maintenance includes lens cleaning, adjusting, focusing, 
etc. Once outside the guardrail railing, workers are exposed to a fall distance is approximately 
100 ft. to the ground.   
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Figure 14: Scenario 2 (Launch Complex Payload) 
 
Case Study: A 47 year old is working off of the Launch Complex Payload (LCP) platforms at 
any level in this NASA/KSC facility on the orbiter payloads. There is minimal lighting in the 
facility for the worker.  The fall distance is 60 + ft off platforms. All edges of platforms are 
















Figure 15: Scenario 3 (Vehicle Assembly Building) 
 
Case Study: During construction, up to approximately three workers with an average age of 25 
replace and repair roof material near the edge of the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) roof. 
Temporary Horizontal lifeline is installed (solid yellow line). A vertical line lifeline (dotted 
yellow line) is mounted to adjust the system to the proper length. The fall distance is in excess of 






Schematic Diagram  





















Figure 16: Schematic Diagram 
(Dagdeviren, M., 2008; McCauley-Bell and Badiru, 1996) 
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Fuzzy Model Algorithm  
The following Algorithm was adopted from the previous (Dagdeviren, 2008) study 
regarding a fuzzy AHP model (schematic diagram) for a faulty system in a work safety 
environment. The method was emulated because falls are under the umbrella system safety and 
is a hazard in the workplace.   
BEGIN 
Identify and classify the categorical risk factors and sub factors  
(Conceptual Model) 
Identify the significant factors that contribute to falls  
(Literature Review and Other Sources) 
 Identification of significant categorical and sub-factors is conducting by observing the 
repeatability of three or more of same risk factors in the literature, Fall Hazard Report (2005), 
and current IRIS (NASA Mishap Data 2005-2008), etc. until the list was completely exhausted. 
The following list is a sample of 40 risk factors observed in the literature from a list of 
approximately 150 risk factors. For instance, age showed up approximately four times and 
environmental surface showed up three times. The benchmark for determining the final risk 
factors in the model was observing the reoccurrence of the same risk factor in the literature and 
NASA Fall Hazard Report.  The multiple risk factors that contribute to falls in a general 




Source of fall:    
1. Slip and Trip (Davis, 1983) 
2. Slip and Trip (Maynard, 2002)  
3. Slip and Trips (Holmes, N., 1999)  
4. Prioproception (Gauchard, 2001) 
5. Prioprioception (S.Lord, 2003)  
6. Poor lighting (Hanson, 1999)  
7. Poor Lighting (Maynard, 2002)  
8. Management (Salazar, M., 2005)  
9. Leadership/Management ( Bentley & Haslam, 1998)  
10. Age (Lockhart, 1998) 
11. Age ( Bentley, 2009)  
12. Age (Agnew, 1993) 
13. Age (Webster, 2000) 
14. Sex/Gender (Webster, 2000) 
15. Sex ( BLS, 2007)  
16. Sex/Gender ( Bentley, 2009 and Masud & Morris, 2001)  
17. Behavior (Maynard, 2002)  
18. Behavior (Salazar, M., 2005)  
19. Heights (Maynard, 2002)  
20. Heights (Holmes, N., 1999)  
21. Heights (Maynard, 2002)  
22. Surface Contaminants (Bentley, 2009)  
23. Environmental Contaminants (Gauchard, 2001)  
24. Floor Contaminants (Maynard, 2002)  
25. Nonmoving vehicles (BLS, 2007) 
26. Nonmoving vehicles: trucks (Jones, D. 2003)  
27. Coefficient of Friction (Maynard, 2002)  
28. Friction Variation (Chang, Wen-Ruey, 2008)  
29. Posture (Wogalter, 2006)  
30. Postural Control or Neuropathy (Kim, B.J., 2005)  
31. Task Frequency (NASA Fall Hazard Report, 2005)  
32. Task Frequency (IRIS, 2008)  
33. Task Duration (NASA Fall Hazard Report, 2005)  
34. Task Duration (IRIS, 2008)  
35. Fall Hazard Occurrence (NASA Fall Hazard Report, 2005)  
36. Fall Hazard Occurrence (IRIS, 2008)  
37. Fall Hazard Protection (NASA Fall Hazard Report, 2005)  
38. Fall Hazard Protection (IRIS, 2008)  
39. Worker Interference (NASA Fall Hazard Report, 2005)  




Table 9: Fall Risk Factors in NASA Ground Support Operations  
 
Task Related Factors  Human/Personal Factors  
Task Duration  Age 
Task Frequency  Number of Workers  
Task Proximity  Worker Interference  
Organizational Factors  Environmental Factors  
Fall Hazard Occurrence  Fall Distance/Direction 
Fall Hazard Severity  Environmental Surface  
Fall Hazard Protection  Environmental Conditions  
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Structure the decision model  
The following figure is the AHP Affinity Diagram. It is the decision model for the 
research. The diagram displays the goal (objective), criteria (factors), and alternatives (areas of 
the concern for fall hazards in NASA Ground Support Operations) in the AHP model (Saaty, 
1990).  

















Figure 17: Affinity Diagram 
Goal:  
Weight risk factors in 
NASA Ground Support 
Operations  
Task Factors   
Human/Personal  
Factors  
Organizational Factors  Environmental Factors  
Task Proximity  
Task Duration  
Task Frequency  
Age  
Number of Workers  
Worker Interference  
 
Fall Hazard Protection  
Fall Hazard Occurrence  
Fall Hazard Severity  
Fall Distance  
Environmental Conditions 
Environmental Surface  
Alternative work areas 
 Facility maintenance  







Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) Data Collection  
Subject Matter Experts can provide some insight on fall prevention intervention. See 
example of the voting instrument in the APPENDIX E. The numbers in the fundamental pairwise 
scale represent the rating for each risk factor. For example, if a task related factor is strongly 
more important than human/personal factor, then the rating will be five. The six subject matter 
experts will be making pairwise comparisons within and between the risk factors based on the 
previous fundamental scale. The three steps in AHP process are: perform pairwise comparisons, 
assess consistency of pairwise judgments, and compute the relative weights.  
 Table 10: Pairwise Comparison Fundamental Scale 





Expert Choice Software 
 Expert Choice Software was used to synthesize analyzed the SMEs results (Saaty, 1990). 
The NASA/KSC Expert Choice voting system allows teams (subject matter experts) to vote 
simultaneously by to making numerical judgments between risk factors that contribute to falls. 
Determine the work environment 
The areas that of concern for fall hazards in NASA Ground Support Operations are: 
Facility maintenance, Space Shuttle Operations, Payloads, Cranes, Construction, and Roofing. 
The model can be applied to any work environment. The higher and low boundaries were 
determined by the expert team based on the work area and tasks according to the following range 
for comprehensive Range of Fall Injury. 
Determine the level of existence for each risk factor 
  The level of existence for each risk factor will be determined by using following 
triangular fuzzy scale. The level of existence for each risk factor is determined from the fuzzy 
membership functions inputs (the risk factor ranges). The level of existence is the numerical 
value and linguistic variables for each risk factor that contribute to falls. The range of 
comprehensive risk (CR) of falls is:  10 ≤≤ CR   
Table 11: Triangular Fuzzy Scale 






Linguistic variables  Meaning of Fuzzy Numbers  
Low  0-.33 
Medium  0.34-0.66 
High  0.67-1.0 
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Membership Functions  
The next section is about Fuzzy Set Theory membership functions for various risk factors 
that contribute to falls. A membership functions are used to characterize risk factors or portray 
the universe of discourse.  There are many types of fuzzy membership functions such as linear, 
triangular, trapezoidal, Gaussian, bell, sigmoid (s-shaped), but two were selected and applied to 
this research. Triangular membership function was selected to characterize the age 
(human/personal risk factor) in relation to falls. However, a sigmoid (s-shaped) membership 
function was selected to characterize the other risk factors such as task duration (task risk factor), 
fall distance (environmental risk factor), and fall hazard occurrence (organizational risk factor). 
A membership function (MF) is a curve that defines how each point in the input space or the 
universe of discourse is mapped to a degree of membership between 0 and 1.  Examples of fuzzy 
or linguistic variables are low, medium, and high in regards to degree of membership for the level 
of existence in the set.   
In general, the triangular membership function can be specified from the formula below:  
 
         Equation 1   
  
 
       Where,  
       L is the left bound   
       R is the right bound  




Table 12: Membership Function Variables 
 
µtriang(x) or µsigmoid (x) x-value  
Degree of membership for falls   
Scalar quantity (risk factor that contribute to 
falls) 
 
Sigmoid membership functions are also called S-curve MF and are represented by increasing 
and decreasing nonlinear functions. A growing s-shaped MF goes from the left-hand side which 
represents no membership to the extreme right-hand side of the graph which represents a complete 
membership. S-curve MF are represented by three parameters: α which represents zero membership 
value, β the inflection point or the 50% membership point, and γ which represents complete 
membership value. S-curve MF represents continuous cumulative distribution functions and is 
commonly used to model population dynamics.  
In general, the sigmoid membership function can be specified from the formula below: 
, , ,          Equation 2 
     2 /  
     1 2 /  
     1  
Where,  
α= 0 degree of membership  
β= 0.5 degree of membership or inflection point  
γ= 1 degree of membership  
 `  
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The following fuzzy model is representative of McCauley-Bell and Baiduru fuzzy model (1996) 
by using the Fuzzy Quantification Linear Models (Terrano, 1994).  
Calculate the Categorical Risk Factors for falls   
Fuzzy Quantification Linear Models  
Task Related Risk:  
X1 = F(TR) = a1 w1 + a2 w2+ a3 w3  +…….+an wn  Equation 3       
Human/Personal Risk: 
X2 = F(HP) = b1 z1+ b2z2+ b3 z3 +……….+ bn zn             Equation 4  
Organizational Risk: 
 X3 = F(O) = c1 u1 + c2 u2 + c3u3 +……….+ cn un  Equation 5 
Environmental Risk:  
X4=F(E) = d1 v1 + d2 v2 + d3 v3 +……...+dn vn  Equation 6 
where,  
a= task related risk sub-factors relative weight  
b=human/personal risk sub-factors relative weight  
c=organizational risk sub-factors relative weight  
d=environmental risk sub-factors relative weight  
w=task related risk sub-factors level of existence  
z=human/personal risk sub-factors level of existence  
u=organizational risk sub-factors level of existence  
v=environmental risk sub-factors level of existence  
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Calculate the Comprehensive Risk (CR) for falls 
Fuzzy Quantification linear models 
 The following equation was used to quantify the comprehensive risk of a fall is a result of 
all three categories:  
where, 
 Y = comprehensive risk for the given condition  
 X1 = the risk associated with the task related factors   
 e1 = weighting factor for the task related factors   
 X2 = the risk associated with the human/personal factors  
 e2 = weighting factor for the human/personal factors  
 X3 = the risk associated with the organizational factors  
 e3 = weighting factor for the organizational factors  
 X4 = the risk associated with the environmental factors  
 e4 = weighting factor for the environmental factors  
The weighting factors (e1, e2, e3, e4) represent the relative significance of the given risk factor 
category's contribution to the likelihood of injury.   
The comprehensive risk is the aggregate value for the prediction of a fall; which is equal to the 
product of relative weight respective to the categorical risk factors.  
Determine the likelihood rating for the associate risk for falls  
The following table represents the aggregate risk value based on the comprehensive risk number 
and the rating associated with the fall injury in a work environment.  
  
Y= e1X1 + e2X2 + e3XR3 +e4X4              Equation 7   
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Table 13: Aggregate Risk Value Table 
(McCauley-Bell & Baiduru, 1996)  
Aggregate Risk Value  Risk Association  Likelihood 
Rating  
0.00 - 0.20 Very Low risk: Falls are very 
unlikely to occur. Strong Controls are in 
place.  
1 
0.21 - 0.40 Low risk:   Falls are not likely to 
occur. Controls have minor limitations and 
uncertainties.  
2 
0.41 - 0.60 Moderate risk: Falls may occur. 
Controls exist with some uncertainties.  
3 
0.61 - 0.80 High risk:   Falls are highly likely 
to occur. Controls have significant 
uncertainties. 
4 
0.81 - 1.00 Very high risk:  Falls are nearly 








Model Application  
 
Based on the comprehensive risk range, the boundaries were set by the SMEs. The High 
and Low Bounds are contingent upon the range for Comprehensive Risk (CR) of Injury.   
 
Where,  
 CR=Y  
High Bound (HB) 
HB>=0.50 
Low Bound (LB)  
LB<=0.49 
 
Apply the If and Then Rule followed by then the Loop process. Verify the high boundary (HB). 
If ,HBCR ≥ YES then stop process/task and redesign the work area and recalculate the CR 
again. If NO, then verify the low boundary (LB). If ,LBCR ≥ YES, then perform corrective 




CHAPTER IV: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION   
 
The following chapter discusses the research findings. The model was developed by 
combining and defining multiple risk factors that contribute to falls in NASA Ground Support 
Operations.  
AHP Analysis  
The following weights in Figure 18 were obtained from the Expert Choice Software after 
entering the six SMEs judgments of the multiple risk factors that contribute to falls. The following 
are relative weights for these risk factors: Task Related (0.314), Human/Personal (0.307), 
Environmental (0.248), and Organizational (0.130). The overall inconsistency ratio for all the 
risk factors was 0.07, which indicates the model results were acceptable. The results show that 
task related risk factors are the highest cause for falls and the organizational risk are the lowest 











Figure 18: AHP Weights 
 Goal: Weighting risk factors that contribute to falls in NASA Ground
Support Opertations 
 Task Related Factors (L: .314) 
 Task Duration (L: .168) 
 Task Frequency (L: .451) 
 Task Proximity (L: .381) 
 Human/Personal Factors (L: .307) 
 Age (L: .209) 
 Number of Workers (L: .263) 
 Worker Interference (L: .528) 
 Organizational Factors (L: .130) 
 Fall Hazard Severity (L: .289) 
 Fall Hazard Occurence (L: .356) 
 Fall Hazard Protection (L: .354) 
 Environmental Factors (L: .248) 
 Environmental Suface (L: .422) 
 Environmental Condition (L: .298) 
Fall Distance (L: .279)
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AHP for Groups 
AHP can be especially useful with groups. Each member’s assessments can, of course, be 
evaluated for priorities and inconsistency, and then the group rollup (group segments) can be 
synthesized and viewed the same way. This can be a powerful way to build consensus, as each 
constituent can see where they stand and compare it to the group as a whole. If the group has a 
high inconsistency ratio (more than 0.1, or so) segmenting might reveal where the differences in 
agreement are and why they exist. That, too, can help lead to better understanding and 
consensus. Figure 19 shows the weights for the categorical risk factors where Task Related is 
0.314, Human/Personal is 0.307, Environmental is 0.248, and Organizational is 0.130. Therefore, 
task is highest contributing factor to falls and organizational factors are the lowest contributing 




















     Inconsistency = 0.01
     with 0  missing judgments.
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The relative weights for the task related risk factors are as follows: task frequency 
(0.451), task proximity (0.381), and task duration (0.168). It can be inferred from Figure 20 that 
Task Frequency is the highest contributing factors to fall and the task duration is the lowest 














Figure 20: Task Related Risk Factors Weights 
 
 
The relative weights for the human/personal risk factors are as follows: worker 
interference (0.528), task proximity (0.263), and task duration (0.209). It can be inferred from 
Figure 21 that Worker Interference is the highest contributing factor to falls and the age is the 















     Inconsistency = 0.11
      with 0  missing judgments.
Worker Interference .528
Number of Workers .263
Age .209
     Inconsistency = 0.01
      with 0  missing judgments.
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The relative weights for the organizational risk factors are as follows: fall hazard 
occurrence (0.356), fall hazard protection (0.354), and task duration (0.289). It can be inferred 
from Figure 22 that fall hazard occurrence is the highest contributing factor to falls and the fall 
hazard severity is the lowest contributing factor to falls. The inconsistency ratio is 0.00, which 









Figure 22: Organizational Risk Factors Weights 
 
The relative weights for the environmental risk factors are as follows: environmental 
surface (0.422), environmental condition (0.289), and fall distance (0.279). It can be inferred 
from Figure 20 that environmental surface is the highest contributing factor to falls and the fall 










Figure 23: Environmental Risk Factor Weights 
  
Fall Hazard Occurence .356
Fall Hazard Protection .354
Fall Hazard Severity .289
     Inconsistency = 0.00




    Inconsistency = 0.11
      with 0  missing judgments.
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The following figure shows the synthesis and global weight with respect to the primary 
goal. It is inferred from the table that worker interference, task frequency, and task proximity are 
the highest risk factors leading to falls. The global weights are 0.162, 0.142, and 0.120 
respectively. Therefore, task related factors are the leading risk factors that contribute to falls. 
From employee perspective, it is important to be cognizant of task related risk factors that lead to 
falls. It is observed from the research, the task related risk factors are the most relevant. 
NASA/Kennedy Space Center is a unique aerospace environment where specific tasks are 
performed from excessive heights. In this aerospace environment, tasks are schedule driven. It is 
imperative that the employee understands that task being performed, aware of the fall hazards 
and others while performing the task, and performs the task with safety measures in order to 
mitigate falls.  
 In addition, the inconsistency ratios for the individual SMES were all 0.3 and below, 
which indicates little discrepancy within and between the SMEs. For example, the safety experts 
inconsistency ratio was approximately 0.2, which indicates there is an agreement among the 
experts. The overall inconsistency for the model is 0.07. Therefore, the results are acceptable 
because the value is 0.1 or less.  
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Figure 24: Synthesis with respect to the goal 
Synthesis with respect to: 
Goal: Weighting risk factors that contribute to falls in NASA Ground Support Opertations





Number of Workers .081
Worker Interference .162
Fall Hazard Severity .038
Fall Hazard Occurence .046






The ratings in AHP are subjective; which can lead to inconsistencies. There are several 
ways to validate the weights from the AHP. Please see the following table that displays a few 
alternative ways to validate relative weights in a model. The method that involves creating 
priority vectors among teams (Dagdeviren, M, 2008) will be used in this research. 
Table 14: Alternative Methods for Weight Validation 
 
Method Reference 
Estimation of overall workloads using physiological 
and epidemiological viewpoints and compared to 
NASA TLX results. (Risk Assessment) 
(Jung and Jung, 2001) 
Expert Opinions and Consistency Index (CI) of a 
matrix. (SWOT-ANP Model) 
(Yuksel I. and Dagdeviren, M., 
2007) 
Comparison of priority vector from the studies using 
AHP with the actual relative weight vector to 
analyze validation. (AHP model) 
(Whitaker, R., 2007) 
Using the priority vector to validate the model by 
having two to three different team of subject matter 
experts create priority vectors separately and 
compare results. (AHP model) 
(Dagdeviren, M., 2008) 
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 To level the discrepancies, a priority vector is calculated. Testing the validity of the 
developed model will be done by comparing the priority vectors to actual weights.  As indicated 
in the methodology, the model will be validated by having two teams of subject matter experts 
create priority vectors separately. There will be three evenly distributed SMEs in each group 
including a human factors expert, fall protection expert, and a safety expert.  If the resulting 
priority vectors of the two different sets of experts are similar and that will validate the weights 
in the model. Priority vector is average weight of each factor. If the results of both vectors are the 
same or close to risk factors’ relative weights, then the model is confirm valid.  
Table 15 is the pairwise comparison matrix from Expert Choice Software for the 
categorical risk factors that contribute to falls in NASA Ground Support Operations. The values 
in the table are based on SMEs rankings for the risk factors. The values in the rows are multiples 
of each other. The values were determined by normalizing the columns. The values in Table 15 
are the geometric averages between the judgments of risk factors. The sum is the total value for 
each column or the categorical risk factor. The diagonal elements of the matrix are all 1’s for a 
consistent matrix.  
Table 15: Pairwise Comparison Matrix 
 
Task 
Related Human/Personal Organizational Environmental 
Task Related 1 1 2.5 1.25 
Human/Personal 1 1 2.84 1 
Organizational 0.39 0.35 1 1.51 
Environmental 0.8 1 0.6 1 
Sum 3.19 3.35 7.3 4.76 
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The following values in Table 16 were determined by dividing each entry in the pairwise 
comparison matrix by the sum. The subject matter experts calculated the average of results for 
each categorical risk factor, which is the priority vector and compared it to the relative weights 
from Expert Choice Software. The results are similar. Therefore, the weights are confirmed 
valid.  
Table 16: Priority Vector 
 
Risk Factor Priority Vector Relative Weight Rank 
Task Related 0.313 0.298 0.342 0.262 0.304 0.314 1 
Human/ 
Personal 0.313 0.298 0.389 0.210 0.302 0.307 2 
Environmental 0.2501 0.298 0.0821 0.210 0.21 0.248 3 
Organizational 0.122 0.104 0.136 0.317 0.17 0.13 4 
 
The results in table 16 show that task related are the highest contributor risk factors to 
falls and organizational are the lowest contributor risk factors to falls in NASA Ground Support 
operations.  It can be inferred from the results how a worker can perceive a risk associated with a 
task.  For example, if a worker is performing facility maintenance where the fall hazard is 100 ft. 
versus 8 ft. in an elevated work area, they may assume a high risk for that task. As result, this 
situation could lead to a fall. Also, a worker may be schedule driven, influenced by peer 
pressure, and neglected to wear personal protection equipment. This is a characteristic of a 
human/personal risk factor that could lead to fall. In addition, environmental risk factors lead to 
falls. For instance, the environmental conditions concerning the hot or cold weather could lead to 
a fall. The weather can affect the environmental surface and the worker. If the weather is hot, the 
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worker may prematurely fatigue from heat exhaustion and perspire while performing the task. If 
the weather is cold specifically snowing; with the change in temperature, the worker may slip on 
melting ice and lead to a fall. Therefore, it is confirmed that organizational would be least 
contributor risk factors to falls. 
Fuzzy AHP Model   
Membership Functions  
Membership Functions will be developed for the following risk factors that 
contribute to falls in NASA Ground Support Operations: Task Duration, Fall Distance, Fall 
Hazard and Occurrence. The ranges for the membership functions were determined by the 
subject matter experts (SMEs) and the NASA Safety Index in the APPENDIX F. The 
linguistic variables in the membership functions are based on the meaning of fuzzy numbers 
in Table 11 and Table 25. 
Human/Personal Factor: Age  
Figure 25 is the Age Membership Function. It forms the shape of a triangle. It can be 
inferred from figure 25 that at the age of 45, there are high instances for falls and there is a high 
degree of fall injuries.  
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Figure 25: Age Membership Function 
 
Table 17: Age Linguistic Variables 
Human/Personal Factor      
Triangle    
Age (years) Degree of Membership Ling. Var. 
21 0 low 
33.25 0.5 medium 
40 0.77 high 
45.5 1 high 
57.75 0.5 medium 























Age Membership Function 
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It can be inferred from Table 17 that during the age range of 40-45, there are high 
instances for falls and fall injuries.  There was a common thread and trends in the fall 
data and among other studies. For the age range of 40-45, there are high occurrences or 
instances for falls. There is a parenthetical remark to be made about the observation in the 
research. It is not scientifically sound to say that there is a high degree of likelihood for 
falls due to the unknown base population. In decision analysis, there is a concept called 
base rate neglect or base rate fallacy. The base rate fallacy, also called base rate neglect, 
is an error that occurs when the conditional probability of some hypothesis H (educated 
guess) given some evidence E is assessed without taking sufficient account of the "base 
rate" or "prior probability" of H. In other words, the terminology refers to a decision 
maker using specific information and neglecting the base rate information. For example, 
the campus police will say that a Honda Accord is the most stolen on the UCF Campus. 
Of course, UCF is a large campus and have many cars on campus. It can be inferred that 
the Honda Accord has a high degree of likelihood of being stolen! The statement is false. 
Likelihood is state of being probable. The Honda Accord is a popular car and there are 
more Honda Accord’s on campus. The Honda Accord could have a low likelihood of 
being stolen and still be the most stolen car on campus. The population of cars on UCF 
campus needs to be investigated before the Honda Accord is declared the car with the 
highest degree of likelihood for being stolen. Lastly, according the statistics, the 
population at NASA/KSC consists of majority of employees in the age range of 40-45 
years of age.  In addition, according to the BLS Data in Table 18, the greatest number of 
falls occurred in the age range of 45 to 54 in 2005, 2006, and 2007.  
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Table 18: BLS Data 
BLS Age Range  
Falls 2005  Falls 2006  Falls 2007  
Age:     
  25 to 34  48,760  44,310  44,900  
  35 to 44  60,170  54,280  55,580  
  45 to 54  63,720  57,990  65,670  
  55 to 64  41,480  39,540  48,100  




Task Related Factor: Task Duration   
Figure 26 is the Task Duration Membership Function. It forms the s-shape curve. It can 
be inferred from figure 26 that as the task duration increases, the high instances for the falls 
increases. Therefore, the variables are directly proportional.  
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Task Duration (hours) 
Task Duration Membership Function 
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Table 19: Task Duration Linguistic Variables 
Task Related Factor      
S-shaped    
Task Duration (hours)  Degree of Membership Ling. Var. 
8 0 low 
31 0.5 medium 
40 0.7 high 
44 0.8 high 
71 0.9 high 
80 1 high 
 
It can be inferred from Table 19 that a worker performing a task approximately 40  hours 
or more are exposed to a high risk for falls and spending a long time in proximity to a fall 
hazard.  
Environmental Factor:  Fall Distance  
The fall distance membership function was developed based on the Fall Hazard Severity 
Index. The membership function forms the s-shape curve.   It can be interrupted from the figure 
27 that as the fall distance increases, the likelihood for falls increases. These variables are also 
directly proportional.  
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Figure 27: Fall Distance Membership Function 
 
 
Table 20: Fall Distance Linguistic Variables 
Environmental Factor      
S-shaped    
Fall Distance (feet) Degree of Membership Ling. Var. 
0 0 low 
5 0.2 low 
10 0.4 medium 
15 0.6 medium 
25 0.8 high  
























Fall Distance Membership Function 
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It can be observed from Table 20 that if a fall distance is 25 ft or higher, there are high 
instances for falls and there is a likelihood of a fall hazard. The fall hazard is likely to cause a 
critical injury, permanent or temporary disability and in some cases death.  
Organizational Factor: Fall Hazard Occurrence   
The fall hazard occurrence membership function was developed based on the Fall Hazard 
Occurrence Index. The membership function forms the s-shape curve.   It can be inferred from 
the Figure 28 that as the fall hazard occurrence increases, the likelihood for falls increases. Thus, 
the variables are directly proportional.  
 
 




















Fall Hazard Occurrence (locations) 
Fall Hazard Occurrence Membership Function 
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Table 21: Fall Hazard Occurrence Linguistic Variables 
Organizational Factor      
S-shaped      
Fall Hazard Occurrence (locations) Degree of Membership Ling. Var. 
10 0 low 
25 0.45 medium 
35 0.7 high  
50 0.8 high  
75 0.9 high  
100 1 high  
 
It can be inferred from Table 21, that if a fall hazard is at 35 or more locations, there is 
high risk for falls and is considered recurring safety hazard. There number of falls will increase if 
the fall hazard incidents increase.    
 
Risk Factor Ranges for Existence  
      Table 22 lists the ranges that were established for each variable. These ranges are based 
on the NASA Safety Index in the APPENDIX F and in some cases SME input. If the fall hazard 
occurrence is 50 locations, it is considered a 1.4   in the NASA Safety Index Scale. As a result, 









Table 22: Ranges for Risk Factors  
Conceptual Model Factors Ranges for Fuzzy Model (Left to Right) 
Task Related Factors 
Task Frequency 0.1 to 2.0 
Task Duration 1.0 to 2.0 
Task Proximity 1.0 to 2.0 ( in relation to Fall Distance) 
Environmental Factors 
Fall Distance 0-10ft=  low (0.33), 11-15 ft= medium (0.66), >25 ft, =high (1.0) 
Environmental Surface 0.9 to 2.0 
Environmental Conditions 0.9 to 2.0 
Human/Personal Factors 
Worker Interference 1.0 to 2.0 
Number of workers 1 to 5 (dependent on workers) 
Age 21-70 (years) 
Organizational Factors 
Fall Hazard Severity 1 to 10 
Fall Hazard Protection 0.1 to 2.0 
Fall Hazard Occurrence 1.0 to 2.0 
 
 
Mathematical Model  
The fuzzy analytical hierarchy process (AHP) model was validated by requesting 15 
subjects apply it to three scenarios in NASA Ground Operations. The three scenarios selected for 
the model validation are: Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF), Launch Complex Payload (LCP), and 
Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB). The following data including scenario characteristics was 
collected for each scenario. 
The following level of existence listed in Table 24 was based on the ranges for each risk 
factor and the scenario characteristics listed in Table 23. The data in Table 23 was collected by 
NASA SMES. The ranges were inputted in the triangular membership function. The output was 
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the level of existence for each risk factor. For example, for SLF, age range is 21-70 and the age 
for the scenario was 32 years. Therefore, 21 is the left bound and 70 is right bound in the 
triangular membership function.  The inputs are these boundaries and the output is the level of 






































Table 23: Scenario Characteristics 
(NASA Fall Hazard Report, 2005)  
Work Area  SLF   LCP  VAB   
Factor     
Task Duration  1.2-Medium  1.2-Medium  1.2 Medium  
Task Frequency  1.1-Monthly  1.3-Daily  1.4-Shift  
Task Proximity  1.2-Very close  1.2-Very close  1.2-Very close  
Fall Distance  100 ft.  60 ft.  500 ft.  
Environmental 
Conditions  
1.2-Extreme  1.0-Good  1.1 –Variable  
Environmental 
Surface  
1.1-Poor  0.9-Excellent  0.9 Excellent  
Age  32  47  25  
# of workers  1 worker  1 worker  3 workers  
Worker 
Interference  
1.0-Independent  1.0 Independent  1.2-Multiple  
Fall Occurrence   1.0-Unique  1.2-Common  1.2-Common  
Fall Severity    5.0-Extreme  5.0-Extreme  5.0-Extreme  




Table 24: Risk Factor Level of Existence 
 
Work Area  SLF  LCP VAB  
Factor     
Task Duration  .4 .4 .4 
Task Frequency  .95 .74 .63 
Task Proximity  .4 .4 .4 
Fall Distance  1.0 1.0 1.0 
Environmental 
Conditions  
.54 .18 .36 
Environmental Surface  .36 0 0 
Age  .48 .94 .16 
Number of workers  0 0 1 
Worker Interference  0 0 .4 
Fall  Occurrence  0 .4 .4 
Fall Severity  .88 .88 .88 




Development of the Linguistic Variables  
 As indicated in the methodology section, the following table represents the linguistic 
variables and the meaning of the fuzzy numbers. The following values are based on the 
triangular membership function where there are three points (e.g. low, medium, high). The 
meaning of the fuzzy numbers are the ranges for the linguistic variables developed from the 
subject matter experts and fuzzy AHP study for safety (Dagdeviren, M., 2008).  








Linguistic variables  Fuzzy Numbers  
Low  0-.33 
Medium  0.34-0.66 
High  0.67-1.0 
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Model Usability  
Usability testing or usability practice is a technique used to evaluate a product, system, or 
in this research a model by testing it on users. It gives the direct input on how real users use the 
system. The model usability involves the application of Fuzzy Quantification Linear Models 
presented below. The general linear equations were presented in the Methodology section. Using 
the weights from AHP and the level of existence for each risk factor, the fuzzy linear equations 
will be solved.  
Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) Scenario  
The following are the results for the Shuttle Landing Facility.  
. . . . . . .     Equation 8 
 
. . . . . .      Equation 9  
 
/ . . . . .     Equation 10 
 
. . . . . .   Equation 11 
 
. . . . . . . . .  
           
 Equation 12 
Launch Complex Payloads (LCP) Scenario  
The following are the results for the Launch Complex Payloads.  
. . . . . . .     Equation 13 
 
. . . . .      Equation 14  
 
/ . . . . .     Equation 15 
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. . . . . . .   Equation 16 
 
. . . . . . . . .  
           
 Equation 17 
 
Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) Scenario  
The following are the results for the Vehicle Assembly Building.  
. . . . . . .     Equation 18 
 
. . . . .     Equation 19  
 
/ . . . . .     Equation 20 
 
. . . . . .   Equation 21 
 
. . . . . . . . .  
           
 Equation 22 
 
 
Table 26 is the Aggregate Risk Value table from a previous study with a few 
modifications (McCauley-Bell and Baiduru, 1996). The ranges in Table 26 were developed by 
the Subject Matter Experts. The following table was applied in the model usability to determine 
the aggregate risk values and likelihood rating. The likelihood rating and risk are based on the 
comprehensive risk value (Y).  
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Table 26: Aggregate Risk Value and Likelihood Rating 
  
Risk Value   Risk  Likelihood Rating  
0.00 - 0.20 Very Low risk: Falls are very unlikely 
to occur. Strong Controls are in place.  
1 
0.21 - 0.40 Low risk:   Falls are not likely to 
occur. Controls have minor limitations and 
uncertainties.  
2 
0.41 - 0.60 Moderate risk: Falls may occur. 
Controls exist with some uncertainties.  
3 
0.61 - 0.80 High risk:   Falls are highly likely to 
occur. Controls have significant uncertainties.
4 
0.81 - 1.00 Very high risk:  Falls are nearly 







The comprehensive risk values for the following scenarios are: Shuttle Landing Facility 
(0.404), Launch Complex Payloads (0.351), and Vehicle Assembly Building (0.451). The 
predicted values and accepted values are the likelihood ratings for each scenario. Therefore, the 
Shuttle Landing Facility and Launch Complex Payloads had a likelihood rating of two; which is 
a low risk environment for falls. Falls are not likely to occur.  The controls in the environment 
have minor limitations and uncertainties. However, the Vehicle Assembly Building had a 
likelihood rating of three; which is a moderate risk environment for falls. Falls may occur. 
Controls exist with some uncertainties in this environment. Thus, predicted value from Table 26 
was compared to accepted value in Table 27.  Table 27 is the Fall Hazard Accepted Scale from 
NASA/Kennedy Space Center Safety Report developed by the NASA Contractor and NASA 
Safety Directorate.   
 
Table 27: NASA Fall Hazard Accepted Table 
  
Risk Value  Risk  Likelihood Rating  
0-5 Low Risk Hazards 1 
6-10 Medium Risk 
Hazards  
2 
10-15 High Risk Hazards 3 
15-20 Dangerous Risk 
Hazards  
4 
20-25 Extreme Hazards  5 
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The percentage error was calculated for each scenario by the Subject Matter Expert (NASA 
Safety Manager) using the following equation:  
( )
accepted
acceptedpredictederror −=%   Equation 23 
 
Percentage error is the estimate minus the true value divided by the true value and 
multiplied by 100 with the absolute value. In this case, it is predicted value minus the accepted 
divided by the accepted value multiplied by 100. The final result is the absolute value of the 
answer. For example, the accepted values for the three scenarios were: SLF:2, LCP:3, VAB:3, 
and the predicted values were:  SLF:2, LCP:2, and VAB:3.  The likelihood ratings were very 




NASA Safety Risk Scorecard  
The research involves evaluating risk factors that contribute to falls in NASA Ground 
Support Operations, it is imperative to relate the fuzzy AHP model to the NASA Safety Risk 
Scorecard. Showing a correlation between the fuzzy AHP model and the NASA Safety Risk 
scorecard is the empirical approach to the research and the first time being used in the research. 
Table 26 and Table 27 have 5 ranges associated with the risk and the NASA risk Scorecard has 5 
levels associated with the risk assessment. The NASA Safety Risk Scorecard is a method to 
assess risks at NASA and specifically the future Constellation Program. The NASA risk 
scorecard includes a 5 x 5 matrix in figure 29. For instance, a worker is performing a task on 
High Bay 3 area for the Constellation Project at NASA/Kennedy Space Center. The worker does 
not use pre manufactured fall protection equipment because the fall distance is assumed not to be 
detrimental to the welfare and safety of the human being.  Therefore, in this case the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) requirement for a fall hazard is 
neglected. The subject matter expert evaluates the fall hazard as highly likely to occur. The 
controls have significant uncertainties in the work environment. Consequently, there may be a 
loss of life or permanently disabling injury to the worker. The final assessment using the 





















Figure 29: NASA Risk Scorecard 
 
Consequence  Component 1 2 3 4 5 
Safety  Personnel  Minor  Injury  Injury requiring 
first aid treatment 
Injury or illness; 
medical treatment   
Severe injury or 
hospitalization 
Loss of Life or permanently disabling 
injury 
 System Safety  Minor damage or 
non essential 
flights assets  
Minor damage to 
the program 
critical needs  
Minor damage to 
flight, Ground 
Support assets,  
Loss of mission, major 
damage to flight,  
 
Loss of Flight or Ground Assets or Loss of 
vehicle prior to completing its  mission  
Catastrophic  hazard   
 Environmental  Negligible; 
OSHA/EPA 
violation non 













Serious or repeat OSHA/EPA violation; 
termination of project or program  
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Figure 30 is an example of project where the NASA Safety Risk Scorecard can be 
applied. NASA/Kennedy Space Center is currently working on the Constellation project for 
the new vehicle entitled, Orion 606D Ground Operations. Figure 30 displays simulated 
models are from the NASA/KSC Design Visualization Lab of Human Factors capabilities in 
Delmia Envision that portrays the tasks being performed in the Aerospace Industry. The tasks 
contain the physical system with a human. NASA Risk Scorecard can be used evaluate the 
following work areas and determine the fall hazards in each area. Figure 30 is the models for 
Launch Pad Operations (Pad 39 B) and Hazardous Servicing; which are considered fall 
hazards. Disclaimer: NASA/KSC Constellation Ground Ops Project is under development 

















Statistical Analysis  
Repeated Measures Analysis  
Repeated measures analysis is a systematic method to validate a model. There are fifteen 
subjects participating in the model validation. They are applying the fuzzy AHP model to three 
scenarios. They are repeating the same technique for all three cases. Therefore, design of 
experiment for the model validation was a repeated measures analysis. Repeated measures are 
multiple measurements of some kind being made on the same subject. Repeated measures 
analysis of variance involves two types of factors--between subject factors and within subject 
factors. The repeated measures make up the levels of the within subjects factor.  The objective of 
the repeated measure analysis is to test for significant differences in means when the same 
observation appears in multiple levels of a factor.  
Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance 
The following are the research hypotheses that were tested in the research.  
  
H0: The development of a conceptual model that characterizes risk factors can be useful 
in reducing the likelihood of falls in NASA Ground Support Operations.  
H1: The development of a conceptual model that characterizes risk factors cannot be 
useful in reducing the likelihood of falls in NASA Ground Support Operations.  
H0: A fuzzy analytical hierarchy process model can be developed and validated to 
predict the likelihood of falls in NASA Ground Support Operations.  
H1: A fuzzy analytical hierarchy process model cannot be developed to predict the 






A Kendall’s Coefficient of Concordance test, Attribute Agreement analysis, t-test, and an 
analysis of variance test were performed on the data to evaluate the hypothesis.  
 When several measurements are taken on the same experimental unit (e.g. person, plant, 
machine, subject etc.), the measurements tend to be correlated with each other. When the 
measurements represent qualitatively different things, such as weight, length, and width, this 
correlation is best taken into account by use of multivariate methods, such as multivariate 
analysis of variance. When the measurements can be thought of as responses to levels of an 
experimental factor of interest, such as time, treatment, or dose, the correlation can be taken into 
account by performing a repeated measures analysis of variance. 
Agreement of Data  
  The Attribute Agreement analysis and Kendall’s Coefficient of Concordance test was 
performed to evaluate the agreement of data within and between subjects in the model validation.  
Attribute Agreement Analysis  
Attribute Agreement Analysis is a quality assessment tool used to evaluate the agreement 
of subjects while appraising data. This analysis was done using Minitab. The session in Minitab 
includes the following tables  
 Within Appraiser: Does each subject rate scenarios consistently?  
 across trials? In other words, does the appraiser give the same rating to the  
 same scenario each time?  
 Between Appraiser: Doe the subjects’ ratings agree with each other? 
 That is, do different appraisers give the same rating to the same scenario?  
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The following results in Figure 31 are the Minitab output regarding the Attribute 
Agreement Analysis for the ratings in the model validation. The results show that one 
subject; which is subject # 2 did not rate the scenario the same as the other subjects. The 
rationale for subject #2 incorrect rating is that the subject most likely did not understand 
the scenario. The subjects applied the fuzzy AHP model to the scenarios. The scenarios 
were evaluated twice. For instance, there were three scenarios inspected and only two 
matched in the trials. In Figure 31, it shows that all subjects inspected 3 scenarios and the 
ratings were matched for scenarios except for one subject. For the fourteen subjects, the 
95% confidence interval (CI) for percent matched is 36.85% to 100%. For the one 
subject, the 95% confidence interval (CI) for percent matched is 9.43% to 99.16%. The 
percent matched for the fourteen subjects was 100%. The percent matched for the one 
subject was 66.67%. The rationale for this one subject’s incorrect rating is due ambiguity 
and misapprehension of the scenario in the model usability. Therefore, the fuzzy AHP 




  Within Appraisers  
Assessment Agreement 
Appraiser#    Inspected#     Matched   Percent      95 % CI 
Subject 1             3          3   100.00  (36.84, 100.00) 
Subject 10            3          3   100.00  (36.84, 100.00) 
Subject 11            3          3   100.00  (36.84, 100.00) 
Subject 12            3          3   100.00  (36.84, 100.00) 
Subject 13            3          3   100.00  (36.84, 100.00) 
Subject 14            3          3   100.00  (36.84, 100.00) 
Subject 15            3          3   100.00  (36.84, 100.00) 
Subject 2             3          2    66.67  ( 9.43,  99.16) 
Subject 3             3          3   100.00  (36.84, 100.00) 
Subject 4             3          3   100.00  (36.84, 100.00) 
Subject 5             3          3   100.00  (36.84, 100.00) 
Subject 6             3          3   100.00  (36.84, 100.00) 
Subject 7             3          3   100.00  (36.84, 100.00) 
Subject 8             3          3   100.00  (36.84, 100.00) 
Subject 9             3          3   100.00  (36.84, 100.00) 
# Matched: Appraiser agrees with him/herself across trials. 
Between Appraisers  
Assessment Agreement 
# Inspected  # Matched  Percent     95 % CI 
3          2    66.67  (9.43, 99.16) 
# Matched: All appraisers' assessments agree with each other. 
Figure 31: Attribute Agreement Analysis Data  
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Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance 
 Kendall’s Coefficient of Concordance is useful in the research because it shows the 
agreement of data without discrepancies.  The Kendall test is one of the many nonparametric 
measures of correlation in statistics and used for test consistency among the subjects. A 
coefficient of agreement or concordance is between different sets of rank orderings of the same 
set of things. The test can be used to interpret quantitative data. In addition, the test indicates the 
degree of association of ordinal assessments made by multiple appraisers when evaluating the 
same samples.  
Interpreting Kendall's coefficient of concordance 
Kendall's coefficient of concordance ranges from 0 to 1. The higher the value of Kendall 
Coefficient, the stronger the association (Siegel et al, 1988). Generally Kendall's coefficients of 
0.9 or above are considered great.  A high or significant Kendall's coefficient means that the 
appraisers are applying essentially the same standard when evaluating the samples. The 
following results show that the Kendall Coefficient of Concordance is 1.00, which indicates the 
outstanding high degree of agreement between and within the subjects. The following are the 
null and alternative hypothesis for the model usability.   
 
– H0: The p-value provides the likelihood of obtaining the sample, with its 
Kendall’s coefficient, agreement within subject is due to chance.  
– H1: The p-value provides the likelihood of obtaining the sample, with its 




For a 95% CI, the alpha level is equal to 0.05. Figure 32 shows the p-value for all the 
subjects is 0.1353. If the p-value is less than or equal to a predetermined level of significance 
(alpha level), reject the null hypothesis and support the alternative hypothesis.  Because the p-
values are greater than the alpha level for all subjects, accept the null hypothesis. Therefore, 
agreement within the subject is due to likelihood of sample. There is a relative agreement among 
the subjects in the likelihood of falls.  
Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance 
Appraiser   Coef  Chi - Sq  DF       P 
Subject 1      1         4   2  0.1353 
Subject 10     1         4   2  0.1353 
Subject 11     1         4   2  0.1353 
Subject 12     1         4   2  0.1353 
Subject 13     1         4   2  0.1353 
Subject 14     1         4   2  0.1353 
Subject 15     1         4   2  0.1353 
Subject 2      1         4   2  0.1353 
Subject 3      1         4   2  0.1353 
Subject 4      1         4   2  0.1353 
Subject 5      1         4   2  0.1353 
Subject 6      1         4   2  0.1353 
Subject 7      1         4   2  0.1353 
Subject 8      1         4   2  0.1353 
Subject 9      1         4   2  0.1353 
 
 
Figure 32: Kendall Coefficient of Concordance 
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 Descriptive Statistics  
The statistical variability is data dispersion or spread in a variable or a probability 
distribution. Common examples of measures of statistical dispersion are the variance, coefficient 
of variation, and standard deviation. Variability or variance is no significance difference in the 
data.  Figure 33 is the Minitab output for the model validation. Multiple descriptive statistics for 
a 95% confidence interval and t-test are the following: coefficient of variation (21.36), variance 
(0.251), mean (2.34), and standard deviation (0.501). The results indicate there is minimal 
variability with fuzzy AHP modeling. As result, model evaluation and validation indicates that 
there is no distinction between the current accepted NASA model and developed fuzzy AHP 
model.   
 
One-Sample T test  
Variable   N    Mean   StDev   SE Mean       95% CI 
Rating 1   90   2.3444 0.5008   0.0528   (2.2396, 2.4493) 
 
Variable   N   N*    Mean   SE Mean   StDev  Variance  CoefVar  Minimum      Q1 
Rating 1   90   0   2.3444   0.0528   0.5008    0.2508    21.36   2.0000   2.0000 
 
Variable   Method     CI for StDev      Variance 
Rating 1   Standard   (0.437, 0.587)   (0.191, 0.345) 
           Adjusted   (0.444, 0.574)   (0.197, 0.330) 
 
Figure 33: Variability 
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 Model Validation  
Model validation is certification of conformance to a standard. There are various ways to 
validate a model. Model validation was partitioned into three components: reliability, objectivity, 
and consistency. Reliability is the agreement between and within the subjects. Objectivity is the 
high performance for complex applications. Consistency is full agreement between the models.  
Reliability is the agreement of the data such as the Kendall Coefficient of Concordance 
for the fifteen test subjects when they applied the fuzzy AHP model to the three scenarios. 
Objectivity is the statistical analysis such as the variance as a result of the fuzzy AHP model 
application. There is minimal variability with fuzzy modeling. Consistency is similarity and 
logical coherence among the Fuzzy AHP model and the NASA Accepted model.  
The model was validated by comparing the fuzzy AHP model to NASA accepted model. 
NASA accepted model for fall hazards is the standard for the research. The comparison involved 
the comprehensive risk for falls, predicted likelihood rating, and accepted likelihood rating. The 
fuzzy AHP model is confirmed valid. In addition, there is another way to validate model is to 
conduct the same statistical analysis on 15 NASA SMES and then compare the results to the 15 













Inspected Matched Percentage 
(%) 
P-value 95% CI 
Subject 1 1.00 3 3 100 .1353 (36.84, 100.00) 
Subject 2 1.00 3 2 67 .1353 (9.43, 99.16) 
Subject 3 1.00 3 3 100 .1353 (36.84, 100.00) 
Subject 4 1.00 3 3 100 .1353 (36.84, 100.00) 
Subject 5 1.00 3 3 100 .1353 (36.84, 100.00) 
Subject 6 1.00 3 3 100 .1353 (36.84, 100.00) 
Subject 7 1.00 3 3 100 .1353 (36.84, 100.00) 
Subject 8 1.00 3 3 100 .1353 (36.84, 100.00) 
Subject 9 1.00 3 3 100 .1353 (36.84, 100.00) 
Subject 10 1.00 3 3 100 .1353 (36.84, 100.00) 
Subject 11 1.00 3 3 100 .1353 (36.84, 100.00) 
Subject 12 1.00 3 3 100 .1353 (36.84, 100.00) 
Subject 13 1.00 3 3 100 .1353 (36.84, 100.00) 
Subject 14 1.00 3 3 100 .1353 (36.84, 100.00) 
Subject 15 1.00 3 3 100 .1353 (36.84, 100.00) 
Overall 1.00      
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The previous results in Table 28 show that the Kendall Coefficient of Concordance is 
1.00, which indicates the outstanding high degree of agreement between and within the subjects. 
Because the p-values are greater than the alpha level for all subjects, accept the null hypothesis. 
Therefore, agreement within the subject is due to likelihood of sample. As a result, there is a 
relative agreement among the subjects in the likelihood of falls. 
Table 29: Variability 
 
Descriptive Statistic Name Value  
Coefficient of Variation  21.36 
Variance  0.251 
Mean  2.34 




Multiple descriptive statistics were calculated for a 95% confidence interval and t-test to 
measure the variability. Table 29 lists the summary of the statistical results where the variance is 







Table 30: Model Validation 
Scenario  Comprehensive 
Risk for Falls 
(Y)  










0.404 2 2 
Launch Complex 
Payloads (LCP) 




0.451 3 3 
 
The results in Table 30 show there is compatibility between the fuzzy AHP and NASA 
accepted model. Thus, the fuzzy AHP is in full agreement with the NASA standard.  
Results/Discussion Summary  
The following section is the synopsis of the results in the research. The section includes 
the AHP Analysis results, range of existence results, mathematical model results, and 




AHP Analysis Summary  
 The following is results summary for the AHP analysis. Table 29 lists the categorical risk 
factors in the research.  
Table 31: Categorical Risk Factors 
 
Ranking 
 Categorical Risk Factor Relative Weight 
 1 Task Related  0.314 
 2 Human/Personal  0.307 
 3 Environmental  0.248 
 4 Organizational  0.130 
 
Table 30 lists the task related risk factors in the research.  
 
Table 32: Task Related Risk Factors 
 
Ranking 
 Categorical Risk Factor Relative Weight 
 1 Task Frequency   0.451 
 2 Task Proximity   0.381 
 3 Task Duration  0.168 






Table 31 lists the environmental risk factors in the research.  
Table 33: Environmental Risk Factors 
 
 
Table 32 lists the human/personal risk factors in the research.  
 




 Human/Personal Risk Factor  Relative Weight 
 1 Worker Interference    0.528 
 2 Number of Workers  0.263 
 3 Age  0.209 
   
Ranking 
 Environmental Risk Factor Relative Weight 
 1 Environmental Surface    0.422 
 2 Environmental Condition    0.298 
 3 Fall Distance   0.279 
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Table 33 lists the organizational risk factors in the research.  
Table 35: Organizational Risk Factors 
 
Table 34 lists the ranges of existence for each risk factor according to the category.  
Table 36: Ranges of Existence Summary 
  
Linguistic Variable   Task Related  Human  Environmental Organizational  
High  0.67-1.00  0.67-1.00 0.67-1.00 0.67-1.00 
Medium  0.34-0.66 0.34-0.66 0.34-0.66 0.34-0.66 










 Organizational Risk Factor Relative Weight 
 1 Fall Hazard Occurrence    0.356 
 2 Fall Hazard Protection    0.354 
 3 Fall Hazard Severity   0.289 
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Mathematical Model Summary  
 
The aggregate risk level is determined by applying the following fuzzy AHP model in 
any organization or case. After the linguistic risk and the relative significance are generated an 
aggregated numeric value is obtainable. The fuzzy quantification linear models were used in the 
research. 
Research Hypothesis Results  
 
The following are the research hypotheses for this study. Both null hypotheses were 
accepted and not rejected.  
 
H0: The development of a conceptual model that characterizes risk factors can be useful 
in reducing the likelihood of falls in NASA Ground Support Operations  
H1: The development of a conceptual model that characterizes risk factors cannot be 
useful in reducing the likelihood of falls in NASA Ground Support Operations  
 
H0: A fuzzy analytical hierarchy process model can be developed and validated to 
predict the likelihood of falls in NASA Ground Support Operations.  
H1: A fuzzy analytical hierarchy process model cannot be developed and validated to 
predict the likelihood of falls in NASA Ground Support Operations.   
The research hypotheses were validated by conceptual model, mathematical model, and 
the statistical analysis results. The research findings indicated that having cognizance of risk 




Support Operations. A fuzzy AHP model was developed and validated in the research. The 
results from the fuzzy AHP model were compared and confirmed with the NASA accepted scale 





CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION  
 
 The research is consistent with prior literature; which states there are multiple risk 
factors that contribute to falls in NASA Ground Support Operations. Falls remain a significant 
problem in an occupational environment. The current literature reviews numerous risk factors 
that lead to falls in the workplace. These factors can be categorized broadly as environmental, 
risk, organizational, human/personal, and task-related. Current measures to reduce falls focus 
mainly on fall protection procedures, such as the use of covers, guard rails, safety nets, safe 
monitoring systems, etc. But these procedures are not practical for all organizations. However, 
future research on preventing falls in an industrial environment such should consider the main 
effects and the interaction of factors that affect the balance control of the worker. Ultimately, 
safety should be the number one priority of any organization.  
Research Gaps Addressed  
There are research needs in field of fall mitigation. The following are the gaps indicated in the 
literature.    
• Knowledge and understanding of contributing risk factors that influence falls in NASA 
Ground Support Operations ((Hongwei Hsiao, 2008; Petre Simeonova, 2001) 
The previous gap was filled by identified and classifying the recurring and significant 
risk factors that contribute to falls in a general work environment and an aerospace work 
environment.  
• Aggregate impact and interactive nature of risk factors that influence falls (Gauchard, G., 
2001) 
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The previous gap is a growing process. A step in progression was made by developing a 
conceptual model based on a theoretical basis from previous studies to understand the 
comprehensive influence of risk factors on falls.  
• Model that quantifies risk factors that influence falls in an aerospace environment and 
specifically NASA Ground Support Operations  (Dagdeviren, M., 2008) 
The gap was filled by developing and validating a fuzzy analytical hierarchy process 
model to predict the likelihood of falls in an aerospace environment (NASA ground 
support operations) and assist in the task and work design.  
Research Questions Addressed  
There are research questions that were addressed in the research. The following are the research 
questions from this study.  
• What are the contributing risk factors that influence falls in the workplace? 
 
The multiple risk factors that lead to falls can be generally categorized in the areas of task 
related, human/personal, environmental, and organizational.  
• How do we quantify contributing risk factors that influence falls in NASA ground 
support operations? The rationale in the research was to develop and validate a model 
that represents linguistic variables to quantify and rank risk factors that contribute to falls. 
The variables were quantified using fuzzy set theory. As a result, the model will evaluate 
qualitative and quantitative data.  
• What is the aggregate risk value of these risk factors on falls?  
The total effect or the aggregate risk value of the risk factors that lead to falls was the 
comprehensive risk in the fuzzy AHP model.  
 125
• How we will predict the likelihood of falls? 
The likelihood of falls was predicted by using the aggregate risk value and likelihood 
rating for the falls in an aerospace environment such as NASA Ground Support 
Operations.    
Research Limitations  
Fall is preventable by multidimensional assessment and targeted intervention. The 
limitations in the study are not considering the interaction of risk factors in the model that 
contribute to falls or the global weights of risk factors. The model local weights for the risk 
factors were used in the research. However, the global weights the model were analyzed. The 
global weights indicate how the risk factors compare against each other in the whole model.  
Model Importance and Applications  
It is imperative to understand the cause of the problem in order to prevent the effect. The 
cause in this model was the risk factor and fall was the effect. A model is not the real world but 
merely a human development to assist in understanding real world systems. The key features in 
the model were:  assumptions simplified, boundary conditions identified, and applicability of the 
model understood. The conceptual model is a qualitative model that assists emphasize important 
connections in real world systems and processes. This is first step in the development of more 
complex models. The Fuzzy AHP model is a quantitative model that involves solving relevant 
equations of a system or characterizing a system. This fuzzy AHP model is innovative method 
for evaluating a problem and specifically falls. This is a step towards fall mitigation and 
prevention and can be applied to any work environment with regards to falls.  
 126
 
Research Contribution  
The fuzzy AHP model was developed and validated by quantifying the risk factors that lead to 
falls in NASA Ground Support Operations. The multifaceted model is ergonomically and 
mathematically sound; which can be applied in any work environment. The purpose of the 
research was to establish another technique to predict and prevent falls in NASA Ground Support 
Operations. The research will be a great contribution to the prevention of falls and to the NASA 
Safety program. The model will aid in risk assessment, assist in task design, and fall prevention. 
It is recommended to use the model in NASA Fall Protection training and Risk Management.  
The fuzzy AHP model is addition to the body of knowledge in field. For instance, there are 
hazard analysis, failure mode analysis, physiological assessments, and risk analysis on falls in 
the literature. However, the fuzzy AHP model can be applied to a Human Performance 
Assessment, Biomechanics, and Athletic Training.  For example, to assess the risks in athletic 
training, there is need for understanding, identifying, and quantifying the risk factors that may 
lead to a hazard during that period. Therefore, the fatalities and personal injuries will be 
prevented. The contribution is the utilization of the valid fuzzy AHP model to predict the 
likelihood of falls. The fuzzy AHP model is numerical, quantifiable, and it has granularity. 
Granularity is distribution of parts in a comprehensive approach that has been uniformly exposed 
and processed. The fuzzy AHP model is a numerical model. The model also gives insight of the 
risk associated with the fall. The fuzzy AHP model is intuitive because it provides understanding 
based on identification of relationships and behaviors.  For example, the aggregate risk value of 
0.69 in the model indicates a high linguistic variable, high risk where falls are highly likely to 
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occur, and a likelihood rating of 4. Controls have significant uncertainties. This is a tool that can 
be applied to any organization. The benefit of this research is the application of the model for a 
safety engineering management class. Lastly, this research effort provides, tools, systems, methods, 
and techniques to measure and assess falls in an aerospace environment such as the NASA Expert 
Choice voting system, creation of priority vectors, taxonomy development, fall hazard assessment, 
and the fall risk factors survey. The research produced a reliable fuzzy AHP model that is prepared to 




CHAPTER VI: RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH  
 
 After completing the research and reviewing literature on falls, here are the following 
recommendations:  
Management  
• Establish and implement procedures that significantly reduce the number injuries and 
deaths due to falls.  
 
• Conduct regular inspections of working and walking surfaces to identify hazards that 
could lead to slips, trips, and falls followed by immediate corrective action to avoid 
recurring incidents as indicated in the schematic diagram for the fuzzy AHP model.  
 
• Implement extensive fall protection training or risk management course  
 
• Establish a NASA online course in Satern (Training website) for fall prevention.  
 
• Hold all employees especially high risk areas for falls accountable to take the previous 
training and course annually.  
 
Employee  
• Every employee in NASA Ground Supports Operations and specifically in those areas for 
the fall hazard concerns should to take the training/course annually.  
 
It is recommended to use the model in this study to predict the likelihood of falls in an 
aerospace environment and provide recommendations for fall abatement. The table displays the 
objective or goal and the method of corrective action. For example, objective C is to reduce 
energy levels. One of the major future goals is to Go green and optimize energy performance. It 
was observed in the NASA Ground Support Operations, that majority of the work areas had a 
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fall distance of over 100 ft.; which is considered high. This is a fall hazard and may lead to falls. 
The following tables are recommended protection methods that can prevent falls and injuries.  
As result, using safety measures and protection methods can ultimately save your life.  
 
 
Table 37: Protection Methods 
(Bauer, 2006)  
OBJECTIVE METHOD 
A. Prevent falls of people 1. Remove tripping and slipping hazards 
  2. Protect edges and openings 
  a. Provide barriers (guardrails, covers, cage, etc. 
  b. Proved visual and auditory warnings 
  3. Provide grab bars, handrails, and handholds 
  4. Provide fall-limiting equipment 
B. Prevent objects from falling on people 1. Housekeeping (remove objects that could fall) 
  2. Barrier (ice boards, guardrail, infill, covers, etc. 
  3. Proper stacking and placement 
  4. Fall zone 
  5. Overheard protection 
C. Reduce energy levels 1. Reduce fall distances 
  2. Reduce weight of falling objects 
  3. Control fall deceleration 
D. Reduce injuries from falls and impact 1. Increase area of impact force 
  2. Increase energy absorption distance 
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Future Research  
 
The following section is the proposed future research after completing this dissertation.   
Some of the proposed future research includes compare and contrasting other fall prediction 
models to the Fuzzy AHP model in this study, developing a cost and benefit analysis for fall 
simulated training module vs. fall protection training course. Another future research activity 
is to develop a statistical model using stepwise regression on the most current BLS Data (e.g. 
BLS 2007-2008) and observed if there are any other trends in the data. Once of the 
limitations of this research was evaluating the interaction of multiple risk factors that 
contribute to falls. In addition, future research includes increasing the number of risk factors 
in the model to show the interactive nature of other risk factors that contribute to falls. 
However, it is essential to recognize and comprehend the interactive nature of risk factors 
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